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The Canadian government has made commitments to transition Canada to a carbon 
neutral economy by 2050, but to date have yet to announce a policy pathway to achieve 
its goal. This study uses the CIMS energy-economy model to assess two policy 
packages that could help Canada achieve carbon neutrality by 2050: one focusing on 
carbon pricing and the other on flexibly designed regulations. Each were modeled in two 
scenarios, which represented different levels of global climate action. Both policy 
packages are likely to achieve significant emissions reductions, though reductions will 
likely come from different sectors of the Canadian economy depending on how 
aggressively the rest of the world acts on climate change. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Background 
Over the last several decades the dangers associated with climate change have become 
increasingly clear and the need for action ever more pressing. While natural cycles 
continually shift global climate regimes, the anthropogenically driven changes earth’s 
climate is currently experiencing are unprecedented in modern times. These recent 
changes are largely driven by the burning of fossil fuels which release greenhouse 
gasses (GHGs) into the atmosphere, creating a warming effect. Scientific assessments 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) indicates this warming leads 
to a number of disastrous effects including species extinction, increased risk of forest 
fires, and the disappearance of polar ice sheets. Prompted by these dire warnings many 
countries, including Canada, have committed to cutting GHG emissions.  
During the 2019 Canadian federal election, the Liberal Party of Canada (2019) pledged 
to introduce legislation that would ensure Canada achieves carbon neutrality by 2050, 
meaning that any residual emissions in that year would be completely offset by 
processes that extract emissions from the atmosphere. Few nations have put 
themselves on a course towards carbon neutrality and there is no beaten path Canada 
can follow to achieve this promise. For a country with emissions per capita in the top 20 
worldwide, this will be no small feat (World Bank, 2019). Carbon neutrality will require a 
concerted effort that addresses all aspects of the Canadian economy and takes 
international policy developments into consideration. 
In 2016, Environment and Climate Change Canada released the Pan - Canadian 
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, which outlined a plan intended to 
help Canada reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2030 by 30 percent as 
compared to 2005 levels. Policies within the framework include emission pricing, the 
phase-out of coal from use in electricity generation, and clean fuel standards in 
transportation. As of 2017, Canada had managed a 2% reduction below 2005 levels 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). While these gains may seem small, 
it will take time for their full effects to play out and current emissions may have been 
significantly higher without some of the more important policies that have already been 
implemented. For example, the phase-out of coal for electricity generation in Ontario, 
completed in 2014, has contributed significantly to the province's 22% reduction in 
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emissions compared to 2005 levels (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). 
However, emission increases from the oil and gas (23%) and transportation (7%) sectors 
have wiped out much of the gains. Figure 1 shows emissions from the different 
economic sectors in Canada from 1990 through to 2018. 
 
 
 Figure 1:  Canadian GHG emissions by sector in 1990 and 2018 
 
There are important differences in the economic sectors that produce GHG emissions in 
Canada, with a portion of emissions being tied to domestic consumption and others to 
emissions-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) industries that compete with foreign firms for 
sales of their products in Canada and foreign markets. Non-EITE emissions are those 
produced by the commercial, residential, transportation, and electricity sectors while 
EITE emissions come from industries including the petroleum, mining, and 
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manufacturing sectors. Emissions produced by non-EITE sectors should be addressed 
differently than those produced by EITE sectors as any increases in the cost of exported 
products could cause their production to leave Canada for jurisdictions with weaker 
climate policies, in what is known as carbon leakage (Aichele & Felbermaer, 2015). This 
would not only hurt Canada economically but may not decrease global emissions if 
production shifts to a jurisdiction with an equal or greater carbon intensity. This makes 
decreasing emissions for EITE sectors challenging, especially without a global coalition 
of countries acting together on climate change. 
The difference in emissions between economic sectors reflects the regional resource 
heterogeneity in Canada. Some provinces, such as British Columbia, are naturally 
endowed with huge amounts of non-emitting hydropower, while others, like Alberta, have 
access to some of the largest reserves of hydrocarbons in the world (National Energy 
Board, 2018). This access to resources has shaped the development of their economies 
and energy systems, leading to the dramatically different levels of emissions illustrated 
by Figure 2. Because of this divide, the burden of reducing emissions on the path to 
carbon neutrality will fall disproportionately to those regions that rely most heavily on 
fossil fuels. To further complicate the matter, this issue has spilled into the political 




Figure 2:  Canadian GHG emissions by province in 1990 and 2018 
 
If Canada is to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, one of two things need to happen: a) 
the emission of all GHGs in Canada must stop, or b) for every tonne of GHGs Canada 
emits, one tonne will need to be captured and stored underground in what is known as 
carbon capture and storage or offset in another way. While neither of the scenarios is 
impossible, it may prove very difficult to eliminate all emissions by 2050, since some 
regions of Canada, such as Alberta, rely heavily on fossil fuels energy sources. Recent 
investment into direct air capture technology has also dramatically reduced costs in 
recent years and could prove to be an important aspect of decarbonization efforts (Keith, 
et al., 2018). Of course, without any policies inducing the switch to low carbon 
technology, the role of carbon capture and storage and offsets would be limited to a 
select few situations. The following section will outline some of the policy options 
available to ensure emissions reductions occur. 
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1.1. Evaluating Policies 
When selecting and implementing policies, it is important to remember that they are not 
all created equal. Policies vary across a variety of criteria including a) economic 
efficiency, b) environmental effectiveness, c) political acceptability, and d) administrative 
feasibility. An economically efficient policy will achieve emissions reductions at close to 
the lowest cost per tonne. These policies are generally broad-based and allow for 
flexibility in how they are met, which allows emitters to make reductions in the way that is 
the lowest cost for them. Environmental effectiveness refers to the ability of a policy to 
reduce emissions to the desired level. Policies that do well on this criterion generally act 
directly on pollution through either taxes or regulations. Policies that do poorly on this 
criterion, such as information programs, provide no economic incentive to reduce 
emissions. Political acceptability is how popular or unpopular the policy is with the 
general public. This is an important criterion, as politicians are unlikely to implement 
significantly unpopular policies and, even if they do, subsequent administrations may 
repeal them to appease voters. Policy continuity is especially necessary to address long-
term problems like climate change, as the shift to a zero-emission energy-economy 
system will take decades. To enhance continuity, policies should also be designed in a 
way that makes them robust and less at risk of repeal should political leadership change. 
Administrative feasibility refers to the ability of the government to implement a policy and 
consists of two important parts. The first is jurisdictional, which means any proposed 
policy must fall within the powers of the government implementing it. Since achieving net 
zero is a federal initiative, most of the policies outlined in this study fall within federal 
jurisdiction, although important provincial ones are also included. The second important 
part is the capability of the government to effectively implement the policy. Emissions 
reduction policies that are similar to functions the government already performs are more 
administratively feasible to implement. 
1.1.1. Carbon Pricing 
Carbon pricing is either cap-and-trade or carbon taxes and is often touted as the most 
economically efficient means of reducing carbon emissions (Canada’s Ecofiscal 
Commission, 2019). These mechanisms fall into a category known as Pigouvian pricing, 
which is designed to correct for the effects of negative externalities (Sandmo, 2008). 
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Pigouvian pricing is used when the consumption of a product or service inflicts harm on 
a third party to the transaction and is not accounted for in the market price. This results 
in the over-consumption of the good or service compared to what is socially optimal. 
Adding a tax will increase the market price and decrease demand to a more socially 
optimal level. In this case, any good or service emitting GHGs during its use or 
production would be subject to such a tax. 
Research shows that increasing the cost of emitting GHGs through carbon pricing is 
effective at reducing emissions and has shown promise in British Columbia (Murray & 
Rivers, 2015). While emissions have not fallen since the tax was first implemented, they 
would have likely been even higher without it. Rather than signaling carbon pricing is 
ineffective, this indicates the carbon tax needs to be raised for emissions to be reduced. 
However, raising carbon taxes to the point where they are stringent enough to cause 
substantial decarbonization may be difficult, as evidence has shown carbon pricing to be 
unpopular even at low levels (Rhodes, Axsen & Jaccard, 2014). This makes it a daunting 
prospect for any government to rely on carbon pricing for the bulk of its emissions 
reductions, especially over the several election cycles needed to achieve carbon 
neutrality.  
While carbon taxes tend to be unpopular, steps can be taken to make them more robust 
and resistant to repeal. For example, British Columbia’s carbon tax was designed to be 
revenue neutral, with revenues generated by the tax being offset by cuts to personal and 
business income taxes. (Murray & Rivers, 2015). In the event an incoming government 
wanted to repeal this carbon tax, they would have to either increase taxes or make 
budget cuts elsewhere, or run a budget deficit, which may prove unpopular. So, while 
the carbon tax itself is not popular, its revenues are used in a way that may make the 
policy more politically resilient. 
Under a carbon tax, every tonne of GHG emissions is taxed at a uniform rate, but in an 
internationally integrated economy, such as Canada, this may not be feasible for EITE 
industries. These industries, including steel, iron, cement, and chemical production, are 
sensitive to increases in the pricing of GHGs. Even modest increases in the price of 
emissions could hurt these industries’ international competitiveness and may result in 
production shifting out of Canada to other judications that have weaker carbon policies in 
place, creating carbon leakage (Aichele & Felbermayr, 2015). An output-based pricing 
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system (OBPS) attempts to prevent leakage by allocating companies credits for a 
specified level of emissions based on how emissions-intensive their production process 
is compared to the industrial average (Bohringer et al., 2017). Companies that emit less 
than their allotment are allowed to sell their credits to those who emit over the limit, 
which provides an extra incentive for them to reduce emissions. Companies that emit 
more than the limit must either pay the carbon price on emissions over the limit or 
purchase credits. The allotment is then gradually decreased over time to ensure 
industries are continually reducing emissions. The result of this system is the marginal 
cost of the carbon price is preserved, but the average carbon price paid by all 
companies in the sector is lower due to the allocated credits.  
OBPS style policies exist both on the federal and provincial levels in Canada and have 
been implemented by parties across the political spectrum, with early Canadian 
examples of the policy being introduced by a politically conservative party in Alberta 
(Government of Alberta, 2021). While they have been successfully implemented, this 
does not mean these systems have been effective at reducing GHG emissions. Despite 
implementing its own OBPS in 2004, and having differing versions of it in place since, 
emissions from Alberta industries have continued to rise (Environment and Climate 
Change Canada, 2020a). Rather than indicating OBPSs are ineffective policies this 
seems to suggest higher stringencies are needed to achieve meaningful emission 
reductions. An OBPS fares similarly to carbon pricing on all criteria, except it appears to 
be more politically acceptable than traditional carbon pricing. However, this may be due 
to a general lack of awareness of the policy rather than actual public support of it or the 
weak stringencies at which they have been implemented so far, and the fact that the 
policy only applies to corporations and not voters. 
1.1.2. Regulations 
Compared to carbon pricing regulations tend to be less economically efficient, although 
this varies depending on how they are designed (Liu et al., 2014). Prescriptive 
regulations are inflexible in how they are met and include policies such as the mandated 
use of a specific technology. Flexible regulations allow the regulated party to choose 
how to meet the requirement. This includes policies such as those requiring that a 
certain amount of electricity generated in a region be from non-emitting sources but 
allowing firms to decide how this is met. The distinction between these two types of 
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regulations is not a sharp divide, and so it is better to think of them as two ends on a 
spectrum rather than separate entities. 
Flexible regulations are commonly used in climate policy regimes, including Canada’s 
and California’s (Jaccard, 2020; State of California, 2019). The Clean Fuel Standard, 
which is under development in Canada, provides a good example of a flexible regulation 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2019). The goal of the program is to 
decrease the life cycle carbon intensity over time of carbon emitting fuels used in 
Canada. Each fuel regulated under the Clean Fuel Standard has a benchmark life cycle 
carbon intensity set; flexibility is provided by using a credit trading system that awards 
producers whose fuels fall below this benchmark with credits that can be sold to 
producers who do not meet it. Producers who wish to reduce the carbon intensity of their 
fuels can go about it in a number of ways including blending low carbon fuels, such as 
biodiesel, with their product or lowering the emissions of the production process – in 
other words, reducing emissions anywhere in the entire life cycle of the form of energy. 
For example, a refinery producing gasoline and diesel could equip their natural gas 
boilers with carbon capture technology and store the CO2 underground to lower the 
lifecycle emissions of their products.  
In contrast, regulations like those requiring catalytic converters be installed in vehicles 
allow little in the way of flexibility as each vehicle must meet an exact specification 
before it can go on sale. A prescriptive regulation such as this may be less economically 
efficient than more flexible ones. But as a system, it does still have appeal. In the case of 
catalytic converter installation, it may be more administratively feasible to simply set 
requirements rather than trying to institute a more complicated credit system or some 
other flexible regulation.  
The low visibility of costs is one of the greatest strengths of both flexible and prescriptive 
regulations and gives them a leg up over carbon pricing in the criterion of political 
acceptability (Harrison, 2012). Regulations not only tend to be less unpopular with the 
general public than carbon pricing measures, but they also are perceived as being more 
effective (Rhodes, et al., 2016). This holds true most of the time, but governments 
should be careful when implementing regulations, as describing them with language that 
can be interpreted as restrictive significantly hurts their popularity (Cherry, Kallbekken & 
Kroll, 2011). 
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1.1.3. Offsets and Carbon Capture 
A carbon offset is a credit purchased by one party from another with the agreement the 
seller will decrease their emissions by a specified amount. For example, someone who 
flies with an airline and wishes to offset the emissions from their flight may purchase 
carbon offsets from owners of forested land with the agreement that the trees on it will 
not be cut down. On paper, this sounds like a good idea for reducing carbon emissions, 
however, it falls victim to problems, which potentially dramatically reduces the 
effectiveness of offsets (Bushnell, 2012). The first of these problems is the difficulty of 
determining whether or not pollution would have occurred if the offset was not 
purchased. In the case of the forest, the owner may never have intended to cut it down 
but sells offsets anyway. The second problem has to do with maintaining the offset. For 
the preservation of a forest to be an effective offset, there has to be some way to ensure 
it is preserved in perpetuity. If it was cut down after a few years, the offset would be 
negated. 
While most types of carbon offsets suffer from significant problems one type, direct air 
capture (DAC), presents an alternative that may prove an effective tool in achieving 
carbon neutrality. DAC works by removing carbon dioxide from the ambient air. Carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) is a similar process to DAC, although emissions are instead 
removed at the point of emission, such as coal-fired power plants. When DAC and CCS 
are used in combination, captured emissions can be sealed in underground geological 
formations, which makes the process carbon negative, and can be used as a permanent 
offset (Szulczewskia, MacMinn, Herzog & Janues, 2012). If DAC was used as part of a 
carbon offset program, it could offer a useful method for negating the effects of 
emissions from areas of the economy that prove expensive to decarbonize. Currently, 
costs for this technology are still high, although it is an area of ongoing research and has 
attracted the interest of high-profile investors such as Bill Gates (Brigham, 2019).  
 
1.1.4. Subsidies 
Compared to other environmental policies, subsidies are quite popular among voters 
and it is easy to see why (Cherry, Kallbekken & Kroll, 2011). Rather than punishing 
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consumers for carbon emissions, subsidies reward those who take steps to lessen their 
environmental impacts with monetary compensation in the form of rebates or tax credits. 
This does not mean though, that they are effective or efficient at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, as they end up suffering from the free-rider problem. The intention of 
subsidies is to induce GHG emission reductions by paying people to take actions they 
would otherwise not have, like buying an electric car or using a more efficient home 
heating system. The problem arises when the government has no way of knowing who 
would have changed their behaviour in the absence of the subsidy and ends up paying 
anyone who takes the action. Those who would have reduced their emissions without 
the subsidy, but still receive compensation, are known as free riders and can capture 
over half of the total amount paid out by the government (Alberini, Gans & Towe, 2016). 
To further complicate matters, the funding for subsidies has to be paid by the 
government in some way, which often leaves only the unsavoury options of cutting 
spending in other areas, taking on debt, or raising taxes. 
1.1.5. Border Carbon Tariffs 
Climate change is a global problem requiring long-term collective action to address. 
Nations unilaterally enacting emissions reduction policies can help to slow temperature 
changes, but these measures are unlikely to achieve meaningful results unless there is 
universal global participation. There are also problems when acting alone, as measures 
like carbon taxes can raise the cost of production for companies and may result in 
carbon leakage. Even when a country successfully reduces emissions, other countries 
cannot be excluded from enjoying the improved atmosphere, which encourages free 
riding. Thus far, voluntary international pacts like the Kyoto Accord and Paris Agreement 
have failed to reverse the trend of increasing global emissions. This must happen soon if 
the warming of the planet is to be kept to 1.5 or even 2 degrees above pre-industrial 
levels (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). 
For countries disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of global agreements, an alternative 
exists in carbon tariffs. These tariffs can be implemented by jurisdictions that have 
rigorous climate plans and would be imposed on imports from countries that have 
weaker emission reduction measures in place. This will raise the cost of imports from 
jurisdictions without stringent climate policies and allow local industries to compete on 
even footing. Countries with sufficiently strict climate measures in place would be 
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exempt from paying this tariff, which provides laggard countries with incentives to reduce 
their emissions (Morris, 2018). Currently, no country has a border carbon tariff in place 
and there is some uncertainty on whether this would violate World Trade Organization 
rules (Condon & Ignaciuk, 2013). However, there are indications the European Union is 
considering the measure and it may be implemented in the coming years (von der 
Leyen, 2019).  
1.2. The Transition to Carbon Neutrality 
There is currently little work detailing the policy stringencies Canada may need to reach 
carbon neutrality by 2050, despite indications the federal government will implement 
legislation ensuring this occurs. This gap in the literature provides an opportunity for my 
work to meaningfully contribute to the conversation going forward. While there is a lack 
of studies looking directly at the policies needed for Canada to achieve carbon neutrality 
by 2050, there are several studies looking at the possible technological pathways 
(Bataille et al. 2015; Canadian Institute for Climate Choices, 2021; Government of 
Canada, 2016; Langlois-Bertrand et al., 2018; Trottier Energy Futures Project, 2016). 
These five studies offer differing views of what the future may hold, although there are 
some important commonalities I will discuss below. 
1.2.1. Widespread Electrification 
It could be argued the most important trend observed across these deep 
decarbonization studies are the changes occurring in electricity generation and use. 
There are two important aspects: the decarbonization of the electricity sector itself and 
the electrification of Canadian energy demand.  
Bataille et al. (2015) note the Canadian electricity sector is already less carbon intensive 
than the average of the countries that comprise the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. In all five studies, areas where electricity generation is 
carbon-intensive could see their emissions fall as GHG emitting facilities are either 
replaced by low carbon alternatives, such as renewable and nuclear, or retrofitted with 
CCS. The Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) views hydroelectric, solar, and 
wind resources as “safe bets” to replace emitting technologies, meaning they are likely 
12 
to be significant substitutes in all scenarios1. Currently, Alberta and Saskatchewan have 
carbon intensive grids, but also access to some of the largest unexploited wind and solar 
resources in the country that could be used to replace existing coal and natural gas 
generation (Government of Canada, 2016). The replacement may be especially rapid for 
coal, which in most studies is removed from the electricity generation mix earlier than 
natural gas facilities and sees a total phase-out by 2050 (Langlois-Bertrand et al. 2018; 
Trottier Energy Futures Project, 2016). Natural gas combined-cycle units equipped with 
CCS could persist longer than coal according to these two studies, although they only 
make up a maximum of 5% of total generation in net-zero cases. The demise of coal 
generation is an extension of a current North American trend, which has seen the share 
of electricity provided by coal generation drop in both the United States and Canada 
because of policies and relative costs (Canada Energy Regulator, 2019; United States 
Energy Information Agency, 2020).  
As GHG producing fuels such as diesel, gasoline, and natural gas are phased out of the 
energy mix, electricity may replace them in functions such as home heating, passenger 
transport, and some industrial thermal applications (Bataille et al. 2015). The increased 
demand has the potential to be so large that the Trottier Energy Futures Project (2016) 
estimates net-zero could require a three-fold increase of Canadian electricity supply. As 
of 2018, approximately half of Canada relied on electricity for home and commercial 
heating, with natural gas providing a similar amount of energy to these sectors (Langlois-
Bertrand et al. 2018). Net-zero scenarios in all five of the studies discussed is this 
section find that natural gas’ share may shrink to near zero, being largely replaced by 
electricity. However, the Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) notes that 
replacing natural gas with biomethane in buildings could accelerate the decarbonization 
of the building sector compared to relying on electrification alone. 
Electrification is also projected to play a large role in decarbonizing the Canadian 
transportation sector. As of 2019, over half of the energy consumed by the transportation 
sector was supplied by gasoline with much of the rest being split between other refined 
petroleum products, such as diesel and aviation fuel (Canada Energy Regulator, 2020). 
 
1 The Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) categorizes the climate solutions in their 
study as either “safe bets” or “wild cards”. Safe bets are solutions that have already seen use in 
some places and face no scalability problems. Wild cards are solutions whose future is more 
uncertain and are either in the early stages of development or may face issues to scalability. 
13 
As the transportation sector decarbonizes, the five net-zero studies I reference all project 
electric vehicles (EVs) could be important in replacing gasoline motors. The Canadian 
Institute for Climate Choices (2021) study gives a range of how much market share 
could be captured by EVs which varies from 47% to 96% across their cases. Langlois-
Bertrand et al. (2018) project the penetration of EVs may rise above 80% of market 
share with the Bataille et al. (2015) analysis estimating they could reach 100% by 2050. 
Where EVs do not reach 100% market penetration, the remaining share could be 
captured by internal combustion engine vehicles using biofuels or hybrid gasoline-
electric vehicles.  
The Government of Canada (2016) notes that about 70% of emissions in the industrial 
sectors come from the combustion of fossil fuels for heating purposes in boilers and 
furnaces. Electrification is possible in these areas, as heat pumps and electric furnaces 
can be used as substitutes for low-temperature technologies fueled by coal or natural 
gas in many situations. Other processes, such as the production of steel, can move 
away from GHG intensive methods and use low carbon options, such as electric arc 
furnaces (Bataille et al. 2015).  
1.2.2. Uncertainty Around Carbon Capture and Storage 
Different studies surrounding deep decarbonization in Canada tend to vary significantly 
in their projected use of CCS technology. The report by the Trottier Energy Futures 
Project (2016) does not project CCS to play a role in Canadian decarbonization, noting 
the abandonment of many CCS pilot projects and the cost overruns associated with the 
Boundary Dam coal CCS project in Saskatchewan. Other reports are more optimistic on 
the prospect of CCS contributing to Canadian decarbonization, with Bataille et al. (2015) 
stating it could play an important role, especially in industrial sectors. In this study, the 
authors suggest CCS may be used in a number of industrial applications including to 
capture carbon dioxide produced alongside natural gas and oil in the hydrocarbon 
extraction sector. It could also play an important role in other industrial sectors, such as 
the cement and chemical sectors, where emissions are released through chemical 
reactions during production. These process emissions are often harder to reduce as they 
may be tied to a critical step of the production process where no low-emissions 
substitute exists at a comparative cost.  
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The Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) is quite optimistic on the role of CCS, 
considering it one of its safe bets, when used on concentrated emissions sources. Its 
report also notes captured carbon could be used to produce useful products such as 
concrete in what is know as carbon capture and utilization. The Government of Canada 
(2016) study finds CCS might play a similar role in the industrial sector, as well as in the 
decarbonization of the electricity sector. Most of the electricity sector CCS in the study is 
tied to natural gas generation facilities rather than coal, as it was determined to be too 
costly for the latter. Of the five studies detailed here, none go into great detail on the 
potential role of bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BECCS) in Canadian 
decarbonization, although it is touched upon briefly in the Canadian Institute for Climate 
Choices (2021), Government of Canada (2016), and Langlois-Bertrand et al. (2018) 
studies. While focusing on the global system rather than Canada's, recent work 
produced by Buntar et al. (2020), asserts BECCS may play an important role in global 
decarbonization. 
1.2.3. Different Pathways to Freight Decarbonization 
Unlike the personal transportation sector, which could rely on electric vehicles (EVs) for 
most emissions reductions, the studies referenced here are mostly in agreement that EV 
trucks are unlikely to play a large role in a decarbonized freight transportation sector. 
This is due to the relatively low energy density of currently available EV batteries, 
meaning they would have to be scaled up to an unfeasible size in order to deliver the 
same range as those offered by internal combustion engine vehicles. Of the five 
examined deep decarbonization studies, only Langlois-Bertrand et al. (2018) projects 
electric trucks could capture the majority of the market share. Other reports suggest this 
market share could be split between hydrogen and biofuels, although there is variation 
between cases within the studies. This uncertainty is highlighted by the Canadian 
Institute for Climate Choices (2021) who project hydrogen fuel cell freight trucks could 
capture between 36% and 64% of the market share, with internal combustion engine 
vehicles accounting for most of the rest. The Trottier Energy Futures Project (2016) is 
less optimistic on the future of hydrogen vehicles, with a possible 33% of freight energy 
consumption coming from hydrogen and the rest split between biofuels and fossil fuels. 
Hydrogen uptake varies significantly in the Government of Canada (2016) study across 
cases with different cost assumptions leading to hydrogen possibly capturing a 
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maximum of one-third of the total market share by 2050 to 5% at the minimum. The 
Bataille et al. (2015) study does not give a precise estimate of how large of a role 
hydrogen might play in the decarbonization of the freight sector, but it is implied to be 
smaller than that of biofuels.  
1.3. Need for Analysis 
The transition to carbon neutrality by 2050 will require drastic changes to the Canadian 
economy and a re-evaluation of current climate policies. Previous outlooks on Canadian 
deep decarbonization have shown understandable disagreement on how this can be 
achieved, as 2050 is a long-range projection with many unknown variables. Current 
research has mainly focused on what the technology and energy mixes may look like in 
a carbon-neutral future, rather than on the level of policy stringencies needed to hit those 
targets. The purpose of my research is to address this gap and develop policy packages 
that can achieve carbon neutrality in Canada by 2050. 
Without this type of guiding research, governments run the risk of implementing 
ineffective or needlessly costly policies. In the absence of energy-economy modeling, it 
may be very difficult for policymakers to know whether their policies are likely to achieve 
the desired levels of emissions reductions. This can be further clouded by well-funded 
interest groups who advocate for rules designed to their benefit or advocating for 
voluntary self-monitoring programs2. Without proper policy modeling, overlapping 
policies may also be implemented. Overlapping policies may seem to be effective 
reduction strategies at first glance, but are rendered mostly or completely ineffective by 
existing regulations. Recent research has explored this policy overlap problem and 
found it may serve as a barrier preventing the Clean Fuel Standard from achieving the 
promised emission reductions (Hoyle, 2020). 
An additional benefit of energy-economy modeling is that it can help to quantify the cost 
of various emissions reduction policies. Without it, well-meaning politicians run the risk of 
implementing policies able to achieve significant emissions reduction, but that come at 
significant economic costs. These inflated costs may not only hurt economic 
 
2 Professor Mark Jaccard discusses effects of industry lobbying and the problems of voluntary 
policies in Chapter 5 of his book The Citizens Guide to Climate Success: Overcoming Myths that 
Hinder Progress (Jaccard, 2020)  
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development, but could also result in backlash against the environmental policies. In 
turn, this could result in their repeal by a successive government that may be less willing 
to implement effective climate policy. 
To guide the design of the policy packages in this study, I referenced work by Jaccard, 
Hein, & Vass (2016), who simulated how two different policy packages may be used to 
achieve emissions reductions in line with Canada’s Paris commitments. In their study, 
two cases were used to simulate how policy may induce emissions to fall 30% by 2030 
compared to 2005 levels. The first of these was a case which relied on carbon pricing to 
drive the majority of reductions and was intended to illustrate an economically efficient 
reductions path. The second was a flexible regulations case designed to achieve the 
same 2030 economy-wide target, with reductions mimicking those achieved in the 
carbon tax scenario, where possible. This was done to illustrate that emissions 
reductions can be achieved in a way that is both politically acceptable and economically 
efficient. 
The intent behind my work is the same as Jaccard, Hein, & Vass (2016), and I follow the 
same blueprint laid by their study in an effort to provide two policy pathways that are 
able to achieve carbon neutrality in Canada by 2050. Through this research, the 
following questions are examined: 
1. What are the needed policy stringencies to ensure Canada reaches carbon 
neutrality by 2050? 
2. What are the differences in needed policy stringency if Canada is acting alone in 
addressing climate change compared to acting as part of a global effort?  
3. What impact does the status of global climate action have on the emissions from 
the different sectors of the Canadian economy? 




Chapter 2. Methods 
2.1. Overview of the CIMS Model 
The model chosen for this project was CIMS. CIMS is an energy-economy model 
developed in the Energy and Materials Research Group at Simon Fraser University 
under the supervision of Professor Mark Jaccard (Jaccard, 2009). The model is 
designed to show how stocks of energy-using and energy-producing technologies 
change over time in response to changing market conditions. Differing conditions include 
changes in energy prices, availability of new technologies entering the market, and the 
introduction or removal of government policies. For my research, a national scale 
version of CIMS was used, which groups Canada into seven separate economic regions: 
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and the Atlantic 
Region and Territories. The Atlantic provinces and Territories are grouped together due 
to their smaller energy and emissions profiles compared to the other Canadian 
provinces.  
Individual regions are further broken down into economic sectors that either demand or 
supply energy. Demand sectors in CIMS output non-energy goods and services, such as 
transportation, housing, and industrial products. Energy inputs for these sectors are 
either provided exogenously through a specified price curve or by a supply sector. Prices 
that are set on international markets, such as the price of crude oil, can be set 
exogenously while those that are set at a provincial or near provincial level are 
calculated endogenously through supply sectors. Supply sectors produce energy 
products used by demand sectors and other supply sectors. In the version of CIMS used 
for this research, the supply sectors are the biodiesel, electricity, ethanol, and hydrogen 
sectors. 
 
2.1.1. Market Share and Capital Cost Equations 
Using capital stocks calibrated to a base year, which is currently set to 2000, CIMS 
simulates how these stocks change over time in five-year simulation periods from 2005 
until 2050 (EMRG, 2007). The first main factor that determines the evolution of this stock 
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is the demand for new technologies, which is calculated at the beginning of every 
simulation period. To find new demand, old technologies are retired and removed from 
the existing capital stock, which is then compared to forecasted total demand to find the 
demand gap which needs to be met with new technologies. The second factor is the 
relative life cycle costs (LCCs) of the technologies competing to meet demand, with 
technologies that have lower LCCs capturing greater market share (MS) as described by 
the equation below: 
Equation 1: CIMS market share equation 
 
 
In Equation 1, MS is a function of the capital cost (CC), maintenance cost (MC), energy 
cost (EC), intangible cost (i), discount rate (r), average life (n), and market heterogeneity 
(v) of the technology (j).  
 CC, MC, and EC represent the different financial costs associated with a 
technology. 
 The r variable represents the time preference that consumers or firms have for 
money and places a greater weight on present cash flows and less on ones 
further into the future.  
 The intangible costs captured by the i parameter represent all factors a consumer 
may take into account that are not captured by the other cost terms. This can 
include elements like familiarity with a product, risk preference, or visual appeal.  
 The v variable in the MS equation represents the heterogeneity of the market. A 
lower value for v means the consumers in a market have a greater diversity in 
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preferences and each competing technology will be allocated a more equal 
market share compared to a higher v, all else constant3.  
The numerator of the MS equation represents the LCC of a technology to the power of 
negative v. The denominator of the MS equation takes the LCC every competing 
technology, puts it to the power of negative v, then sums them. This equation gives the 
relative MS each technology captures in a competition as a percentage. 
The MS equation is solved for every demand node in CIMS to ensure total demand is 
filled by technologies. Once demand for all energy-using services is met, a total energy 
demand is calculated. This same MS allocation process is then applied to the supply 
side of CIMS, where technologies compete to fill the demand for energy. Through this 
competition, energy prices are calculated and are fed back into the demand side of the 
model, which adjusts the market shares of technologies based on the new prices. CIMS 
then iterates through this process until it reaches a cut-off point where market shares 
and prices only change a small amount with each iteration. CIMS then finalizes the 
energy prices and market shares and moves onto the next time period. Once CIMS has 
moved through all five-year periods, the run is completed and the simulation ends. 
In the MS equation, the CC and i terms are not fixed and can change over time. Capital 
costs fall through innovations and operation improvements in technologies, as well as 
economies of scale. For example, prices of electricity generated from wind and solar 
have decreased significantly over the past decade due to improvements in technology 
and the scaling up of production (IRENA, 2019). Intangible costs fall as buyers become 
increasingly familiar with a technology, thereby lowering its associated risk perception. 
The declining capital cost equation (Equation 2) is of particular importance to this study 
and became important in defining the climate action scenarios created in this project. 
 
3 See Appendix A, Figure A1 for illustration of the interaction between technology price and the v 
parameter. 
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Equation 2: CIMS capital cost equation 
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐺𝐶𝐶 ∗





In Equation 2, CCt is the capital cost of a given technology in period t. GCCt is the capital 
cost of a technology adjusted for cumulative stock in other countries. NSjp is the new 
stock of a technology added from 2005 to the previous time period in each province, p. 
CumulNS2000,p is the cumulative new stock of a technology for all years up to and 
including the year 2000 in each province, p. PR is the progress ratio which is the amount 
cost should decrease in response to a doubling of cumulative production. The GCCt 
term has been adjusted for certain technologies in this study, which will be discussed 
later in the methods section. 
2.1.2. Simulation Settings 
CIMS has several important functions governing simulation behaviour that can be 
adjusted based on the needs of the modeler. One such function is energy supply and 
demand, which determines if output from selected sectors follows an exogenously 
specified trajectory or if they are endogenously calculated based on demand from other 
sectors. In my study, I turned this function on for sectors whose outputs I assumed 
would not be significantly influenced by international trade, as they were mostly confined 
to trade within Canada. These are the electricity, biodiesel, ethanol, and hydrogen 
sectors. Most of the electricity produced by the Canadian electricity sector is consumed 
within Canada. Although there are interconnections with grids in the United States that 
allow international trade to occur, I determined it was beyond the scope of this study to 
include international trade. 
The production of the ethanol, biodiesel, and hydrogen sectors was set to be calculated 
endogenously because I assumed most of the future Canadian production of these low 
carbon fuels would be consumed domestically and exports would be minimal. Since 
these fuels still make up a small portion of the total liquid fuels consumed in Canada, 
production and emissions from these supply sectors could vary significantly from case to 
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case depending on how much market share their fuels capture. By calculating the 
production from these sectors endogenously, I hope to get a better idea of the net 
emissions reductions achieved by fuel switching than I would if they were exogenously 
specified.  
Prices for coal, oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum products (RPPs) were 
exogenously specified because these products are global commodities whose prices are 
set by international markets and not determined by Canadian demand. Along with the 
aforementioned fuels, I also set the price of biomethane and biomass exogenously. 
Biomethane and biomass may have benefited from endogenous price calculations for 
the same reasons as ethanol, biodiesel, and hydrogen, but the version of the model I 
used for this study does not have separate biomass and biomethane sectors to simulate 
these dynamics. The exogenous prices set for all the above fuels do not include carbon 
pricing, which is added as part of my scenario parameters. 
Many of the goods produced in Canada are exported internationally and are subject to 
competition from other jurisdictions. This competition is captured by Armington 
elasticities, which are parameters that describes how readily similar products, produced 
in different countries, are substituted with one another. Armington elasticities help in 
simulating the effects of policy on international trade as measures like tariffs and taxes 
can create price changes which in turn affect demand (Welsch, 2006). These elasticities 
are presented as ratios and describe how much the demand for a product changes 
based on a 1% change in price. For example, the Armington elasticity for bricks 
produced in Canada may be -0.15, which means that for every 1% increase in price, 
demand for that product would fall by 0.15%. Some of the policies I have implemented in 
this study impact these internationally traded goods, especially in EITE sectors. Since 
these policies have the potential to increase the production costs of these products, we 
should not expect demand to stay the same. 
Sectors existing within Canada are also subject to similar elasticity dynamics even 
though they are not traded on a global market. To illustrate this effect, I chose to turn on 
macroeconomic feedbacks. These are not general equilibrium feedbacks and do not 
simulate how investment or employment may change in response to policy, but rather 
partial equilibrium effects that make adjustments across sectors (Bataille et al., 2006; 
Bergman, 2005). Demand from the building and transportation sectors have activity 
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elasticities that respond to changes in manufacturing production, where a fall in 
manufacturing output leads to a fall in building and transportation demand. A fall in 
manufacturing output can be driven by either an exogenously specified fall in production 
or through the Armington elasticities reflecting the substitution of Canadian produced 
goods with foreign ones. 
The revenue recycling function in CIMS was also enabled for this study. Revenue 
recycling works by returning all of the funds collected through emissions pricing and 
returning them to the sector they were collected from. This in effect means the price of 
the carbon tax is not included in the final output cost calculations, which is instead only 
based on the lifecycle costs of each technology in that sector and how much market 
share it captures. However, the market shares captured by each technology within that 
sector will still reflect the effects of the emissions price as emitting technologies will lose 
market share to low emissions technology, all else equal. In reality, governments may 
choose not to return carbon tax revenue to the sector it was collected from and spend it 
elsewhere. So far, the federal government has implemented forms of revenue recycling 
in its policies, such as the climate action incentive payment which returns carbon tax 
revenue in lump sums to residents of provinces where the backstop carbon price is in 
place (Government of Canada, 2021). Another is the OBPS, which allocates credits to 
EITE industries to cover part of the cost they would otherwise have to pay for their 
emissions (Government of Canada, 2018). 
Emissions pricing was implemented using the emissions charges function in CIMS which 
allows the user to specify how emissions should be priced in every five-year simulation 
period beginning in 2005. CIMS has the option to enter pricing for eight different types of 
emissions, though not all of these were utilized in this study. The amount a technology 
pays on emissions is calculated by multiplying the quantity of GHG’s emitted by that 
technology in the provision of a service by the specified emissions price in the current 
simulation year. This same calculation is done whether the emissions from a technology 
are positive or negative. If a technology has negative emissions, the price of those 
emissions will be subtracted from the cost of the technology rather than added. The 
result is negative emissions technologies receive payments for the emissions they store 
at a rate equal to the carbon price. Under a cap and trade system, this can be thought of 
as a mechanism whereby credits are generated by the sequestration of GHGs, which 
can then be sold for the credit market price. 
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CIMS also offers several ways for future carbon pricing to be accounted for in the market 
share equation. These are accessed through the GHG precognition function which can 
be set to either current, average, or discounting and set to begin at a specified year. 
Current means future carbon pricing is not taken into account in the market share 
equation and may reflect a situation where carbon pricing has not yet been announced. 
Average calculates the average cost of carbon emissions over the technology’s lifetime, 
which assumes carbon pricing is taken into account when making purchasing decisions, 
but not in a perfectly rational way. Discounting takes the total cost of emissions over the 
lifetime of the technology and discounts them back to present values, representing the 
perfectly rational decision-maker. For this study, I used the average method, because I 
believe it represents more realistic purchasing behaviour than either of the other two 
options as it reflects some degree of consumer foresight of future carbon pricing when 
making decisions, but avoids having consumers act as perfectly rational economic 
actors. GHG precognition was set to begin in the 2021-2025 period, as beginning it 
earlier would cause choices made in the past to react to future policies.  
2.2. Changes Made to the CIMS Model 
Through the course of modeling how Canada might reach net-zero emissions by 2050, I 
made several changes to the CIMS model, which reflect the implementation of policies, 
changes in commodity prices, and new technologies entering the market. The following 
section will detail how I implemented these changes and what purpose they served. 
2.2.1. Coal to Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
Despite progress being made towards decarbonization of the Canadian electricity grid, 
CO2 intensive coal plants still make up a sizeable share of the power generated in 
Alberta and Saskatchewan (Canada Energy Regulator, 2019). Many of these facilities 
still have years left of useful life, but are scheduled to shut down due to federal 
regulations. Instead of closing the plants, another option would be to retrofit them so 
they are fueled by biomass rather than coal. The carbon contained in biomass is taken 
from the atmosphere by organic plants (through photosynthesis), therefore the 
combustion of this fuel is considered carbon neutral. Although emissions may be 
generated when the raw plant material is converted into usable fuel if hydrocarbons are 
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consumed in the production and transportation processes. In my modeling, I have 
provided an option for these coal plants to be retrofitted so that they are fueled by 
biomass equipped with CCS technology, known as bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS). This turns these coal plants, which were once a high emissions 
intensity electricity source, into emissions negative facilities. I did not include an option 
for these facilities to be retrofit to biomass without CCS.      
As part of the Ontario government's initiative to phase out coal from its electricity 
generation mix, the Atikokan Generating Station and Thunder Bay Generating Station 
were converted from using coal to wood pellets (Cox, 2018). I used conversion costs of 
the Atikokan Generating Station to parametrize my model. In my modeling, I limited the 
amount of market share the converted plants could capture to the 2015 share of 
electricity generation provided by coal in each province to ensure the number of 
converted units is less than or equal to the number of coal plants currently available for 
conversion. 
2.2.2. Biomethane and Biodiesel 
To ensure there were as many realistic options for decarbonization as possible in my 
model I added the option to use biodiesel and biomethane in a number of different 
markets. I added the option to use biomethane into the residential and commercial 
sectors for home heating and the freight transportation sector as fuel for liquid natural 
gas engines. I added biodiesel to the agricultural sector as a low carbon alternative to 
diesel tractor fuel. Perhaps due to its current limited use, there are few detailed forecasts 
available for the price of biomethane. The prices used in this study were based on those 
charged by Fortis BC for biomethane (Fortis BC, 2021). Currently, Fortis BC biomethane 
prices are about double that of fossil fuel natural gas. I assume biomethane prices 
remain this high then gradually fall until they are one and a half times the price of fossil 
fuel natural gas by 2050 due to improvements in technology and economies of scale.  
Since they are chemically identical, biomethane can be blended with natural gas in the 
current distribution system and even completely replace natural gas with no adverse 
effects. The blending of biomethane with natural gas for home heating is already 
available in jurisdictions such as British Columbia, where consumers can choose to 
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offset up to 100% of the fossil fuel natural gas they consume with biomethane4. The 
option to use biomethane for residential and commercial heating also provides an 
important alternative to electrical heating which was previously one of the few low 
carbon options available in these sectors. While most of the natural gas consumed in 
Canada is currently sourced from fossil fuels, mandates such as those proposed under 
CleanBC seek to increase the blended share of biomethane through government 
regulations (Government of British Columbia, 2018). 
Biodiesel currently makes up about 2% of the total diesel consumed in Canada, although 
its share has been growing on an annual basis (Wolinetz, Hein & Moawad, 2019). As 
Canada moves towards economy-wide decarbonization, this share may grow and 
biodiesel may become an important low carbon fuel source. My work added the option to 
use biodiesel as a fuel source in the agricultural sector. I also imported segments from 
other versions of CIMS that included greater detail in the biodiesel production sector. 
The option to use biodiesel in place of fossil fuel diesel was already in use in the 
personal and freight transportation sectors of CIMS. 
Biodiesel in CIMS is broken down into two different types: conventional biodiesel and 
hydrogenation-derived biodiesel (HDRD), with the important difference between the two 
being their chemical composition. Conventional biodiesel is chemically similar but not a 
perfect substitute for fossil fuel-derived diesel, whereas HDRD is chemically identical to 
its fossil fuel counterpart. This means that in currently available diesel engines, HDRD 
can be blended up to 100% with fossil fuel diesel. Conventional biodiesel can only be 
blended in quantities of up to 20% before engine modifications need to be made (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2020). In this study, I assume the diesel engines sold in Canada 
will be capable of running on higher percentage blends of conventional biodiesel through 
continuous technological improvement and the tightening of government regulation on 
freight motors. This dynamic was captured by phasing out standard efficiency diesel 
motors and replacing them with more advanced options. 
 
4 When a customer chooses a biomethane blend this does not actually result in that blend being 
delivered to their homes. Instead, the amount of biomethane the consumer purchases will be 
blended into the delivery system and distributed to all homes connected to the main supply line. 
For example, if a residence chose a 100% biomethane option and consumed 10 GJ of natural 




While the version of CIMS used in this study is technologically detailed in most energy-
using and emissions-producing sectors of the Canadian economy, its representation of 
the agriculture sector is limited. This is mainly related to non-energy emissions such as 
those produced by livestock. There are a variety of options for how the sector may be 
decarbonized on both the animal and crop production fronts, but the incorporation of 
those pathways is beyond the scope of this study (Aggarwal, et al., 2018). Instead, I 
have assumed the emissions from the agricultural sector fall at the same rate as 
emissions from the rest of the economy in each case in each 5-year period. This means 
if emissions were to fall by an average of 5% across all other sectors of the Canadian 
economy between 2030-2035, I would assume emissions from the agriculture sector 
also fall by 5% in the same period. 
2.3. Scenarios 
In this study, I have created three distinct cases that differ on their level of climate action 
and the types of climate policies implemented. Each of these cases has been modeled 
in two scenarios which represent different levels of global action on climate change: the 
Global Action scenario, which assumes the rest of the world tackles climate change 
along with Canada, and the Global Inaction scenario, which assumes Canada is acting 
alone. These two states of global climate action have important implications for how 
Canada may need to go about reducing its carbon emissions. I do not presume one of 
these two scenarios to be more likely than the other and, as such, I think it important to 
assess policies needed to achieve carbon neutrality under both sets of assumptions.  
2.3.1. Oil Price and Production Assumptions 
Perhaps the most important difference between these two global scenarios is in the 
global price of oil. The Global Inaction scenario assumes oil consumption proceeds as it 
has in the past with demand around the globe rising and continued demand for 
Canadian oil exports. This level of oil consumption is reflected in a higher global oil price, 
which stays constant at $70 per barrel US WTI from 2030 until 2050. The Global Action 
scenario assumes the trend of increasing oil demand is reversed and falls over time, 
resulting in a lower oil price. For my study, I have assumed this price to be $40 per 
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barrel US WTI from 2030 until 2050. These oil price assumptions are based on the 
Canada’s Energy Future 2018 report (Canada Energy Regulator, 2018). 
The differences in oil prices impact my model in two main ways: the difference in refined 
petroleum product (RPP) prices and oil production. RPPs include fuels such as gasoline, 
diesel, and fuel oil, which provide energy for many Canadian economic sectors. The 
price of these RPPs is in part determined by the price of crude oil, but also by refining, 
distribution costs, taxes, and other market factors, which leads to differential pricing even 
within provinces. For this project, I have calculated different RPP prices for each 
province, but I have assumed within provinces all RPP prices are the same. The RPP 
prices entered into the model include all provincial factors impacting prices but exclude 
any carbon pricing. This instead is applied and calculated endogenously within CIMS. 
The differences in demand for oil and RPPs globally will not only impact the price 
Canadian’s pay for their hydrocarbon derived fuels, but also the output of the Canadian 
oil sector. I assume oil-related sector output in the Global Inaction scenario is based on 
projections from Canada’s Energy Future 2018 and rises by 15% in 2050 compared to 
2020 levels (Canada Energy Regulator, 2018). The increased production amounts to an 
extra 0.8 million barrels of oil produced per day, bringing total Canadian production to 6 
million barrels per day, with Alberta alone accounting for 5.7 million barrels of daily 
production. Implicit in this assumption is that current pipeline export capacity constraints 
are relieved. These constraints have resulted in the Western Canadian Select, the 
benchmark for heavy oil produced in Alberta, trading at a significant discount to WTI and 
at times resulted in government-imposed oil production curtailments (Government of 
Alberta, 2021). 
Due to supply and demand dynamics, lower worldwide demand for RPPs in the Global 
Action scenario is expected to significantly lower production from the Canadian oil 
sector. I have assumed production from the Canadian oil sector in 2050 will be half of 
2020 levels, with production beginning to fall in 2025 and continuing to fall smoothly 
through to 2050. This results in Canadian oil production reaching 2.6 million barrels per 
day by 2050, which is similar to the levels seen in 2005. The projected production 
numbers are based on trigger prices estimated by Heyes et al. (2018), who found new 
oil sands mining would require a WTI price of $85 per barrel, and in-situ projects would 
need $58 per barrel WTI. With the price of WTI sitting well below both of these values in 
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the Global Action case, I would not expect to see any capacity expansion of oil sands 
projects and the more expensive ones may even be shut in early. Table 1 summarises 
the oil-related assumptions I have made in my two scenarios. 
Table 1: Oil production, oil price, and RPP price assumptions made in this study 
 
2.3.2. Accelerated Cost Declines 
As the world works together to reduce emissions in the Global Action scenario, the 
market for low carbon technologies is expected to get larger as their adoption becomes 
more widespread. Greater adoption would likely lead to faster declines in the cost of 
these low carbon technologies and drive more investment to help improve production 
techniques and create economies of scale. To illustrate this effect, I have increased the 
declining capital cost parameter for certain key technologies. Rather than including all 
the low emission technologies that may see faster cost declines under the Global Action 
scenario, I selected a few to cover areas of the Canadian economy. The chosen 
technologies were deemed to be the most suitable for my study, as they are not fully 
mature in their development leaving room for their costs to fall. At the same time, they 
are beyond the theoretical development stage and are proven to work, even if some of 
them have only seen limited adoption.  
Electric vehicle (EV) cars are perhaps the most notable technology on the list, as they 
have caught much public attention in recent years due to the success of EV companies, 
such as Tesla, and their increasing rate of adoption. A major factor in this trend has 
been the rapidly falling EV costs in recent years, which could be further accelerated with 
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the implementation of favorable climate policy worldwide (Lutsey & Nicholas, 2020). 
Much of the recent decline in EV costs can be attributed to the rapid improvements in 
battery technology, since most other components of electric vehicles are similar to those 
in those outfitted with internal combustion engines. While there are several different 
kinds of EV batteries on the market, the most prominent are lithium-ion batteries, which 
are used by EV many manufactures including Tesla, Nissan, and Chevrolet. Though 
popular currently, there is no guarantee lithium-ion batteries will retain top position as 
research into alternate battery chemistries may prove fruitful. In my modeling, I use a 
generic EV car that represents trends in EV battery cost in general, rather than having 
separate chemistries or EV components compete for market share. In the Global Action 
scenario, I have accelerated the exogenously specified part of the capital cost equation 
(GCCt in Equation 2) which results in capital costs being 25% lower than in the Global 
Inaction scenario by 2050. EV cost declines are based on projections from the Rapid 
Advancement case of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s (2017) Electrification 
Futures Study.  
Since I have accelerated the cost decline of EV cars, I have also accelerated the capital 
cost decline of EV trucks, as they rely on the same battery technology. EV trucks are a 
zero-carbon technology serving as short-haul transportation in CIMS’ freight 
transportation sector. In CIMS, EV trucks are kept out of the long-haul freight market as 
battery sizes of current chemistries would need to get impractically large before they 
could compete with internal combustion engines fueled by diesel or biodiesel. New, 
more energy-dense, battery chemistries may allow EV trucks to enter the long-haul 
freight market in the future, but for now, I have confined them to serving short-haul 
demand. Sales of EV trucks have thus far been very small with an estimated 6000 units 
sold in 2019 (International Energy Agency, 2020). However, these vehicles are still a 
relatively new technology and could benefit from quickly falling costs as they are more 
widely adopted by the global market. In the Global Action scenario, capital costs for EV 
trucks are 27% lower in 2050 compared to the Global Inaction scenario and are again 
based on the Electrification Futures Study (National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
2017). 
While I did not allow EV trucks to compete in the long-haul section of the freight market, 
hydrogen vehicles were used to provide a low carbon technology. Like EV trucks, 
hydrogen truck sales are very low at present with the International Energy Agency 
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(2019) estimating that only a few hundred have been purchased in recent years 
worldwide. However, this does not mean sales will not pick up in the future, especially 
with nations such as Canada and the European Union releasing strategies intended to 
increase the use of hydrogen within their borders (Natural Resources Canada, 2020; 
European Commission, 2020). Strategies such as these are assumed to be effective in 
the Global Action scenario. Using the same method that was applied to EVs, I 
accelerated the decline in capital costs of hydrogen trucks leading to them being 33% 
lower than in the Global Inaction scenario. 
To go along with the accelerated decline of hydrogen truck capital costs, I have also 
accelerated the capital cost decline of electrolysers, which use electricity and water to 
produce hydrogen. Although most hydrogen used today is produced through the 
reformation of fossil fuels, 2019 was a record year for the installation of electrolysers and 
a continuation of this trend will likely lead to decreasing costs. Currently, the chemical 
products and petroleum refining sectors are the main sources hydrogen demand, 
although the widespread adoption of hydrogen vehicles could shift this balance 
(International Energy Agency, 2019). The exogenously specified part of the capital cost 
decline function for electrolysers in the Global Action scenario was increased leading the 
capital cost to be 33% lower compared to the Global Inaction scenario. 
Both wind and solar energy generation have seen large increases in their share of 
electricity generation in recent years due to improvements in generation technology and 
assistance from government policy (IRENA, 2019). In the Global Action scenario, I 
expect this trend to accelerate further and will decrease the capital costs of solar 
installations by 40% and wind installations by 20% by 2050. This acceleration was done 
using the same method that was applied to the other technologies in this section. These 
declines are based on estimates from the Canada’s Energy Future 2018 report (Canada 
Energy Regulator, 2018). Solar energy costs fall more quickly than those of wind 
because solar is a less established technology. Being less established provides solar 
with more room to achieve greater cost reductions as techniques in its production 
improve and increased adoption results in economies of scale. While wind power is by 
no means a fully matured technology, it has had been present in electricity markets for 
several decades and projections suggest improvements will come more slowly. Tied in 
with this is the assumption the storage costs for wind and solar will also decrease at the 
same rate. At higher market penetrations, variable renewable resources benefit from 
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being paired with energy storage options like batteries or pumped storage hydro. This is 
done so energy produced at times of low demand can be stored and later used during 
high demand periods. CIMS does not have explicit technologies that compete to provide 
energy storage in the electricity sector, but these are simulated through the use of higher 
capital costs attached to variable (or non-dispatchable) renewables at higher levels of 
market penetration.  
2.4. Cases 
I modeled six cases to reflect different levels of global action on climate change and 
different policy paths the Canadian government could pursue through to 2050. The case 
names and their basic characteristics are displayed in Table 2: 
Table 2: Matrix of cases modeled in this study 
 
I created the Reference (Ref) cases to illustrate what Canadian emissions may look like 
by 2050 if further policy action is not taken. The cases in this study designed to achieve 
carbon neutrality by 2050 are the two Carbon Tax (C Tax) cases and the two Flexible 
Regulations (Flex Regs) cases. Collectively these cases are referred to as “net-zero 
cases”. The C Tax cases are designed to achieve emissions reductions in the most 
economically efficient way possible, while not worrying about political acceptability. The 
Flex Regs cases are designed in a way that trades off some of the economic efficiency 
of the C Tax cases for policies expected to be more politically acceptable. Since 
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emissions reductions differ between the two C Tax cases, some of the policies are set at 
different stringencies in the two Flex Regs cases. The policies in the Flex Regs and C 
Tax cases are mainly implemented in addition to those in the Ref cases. The exception 
to this is in the Flex Regs cases which have had the Ref case carbon price removed. 
In the context of this research, net-zero does not mean emissions from the Canadian 
economy fall to zero, but rather that all remaining emissions are offset through the 
capture and storage of CO2 with direct air capture (DAC) technology. Cost estimates for 
commercial DAC put the price of capturing a tonne of CO2 between about $130 and 
$320 CAD (Keith et al., 2018). However, this range does not include transportation and 
storage costs which should be included in a full life cycle cost assessment and would 
likely lead to higher costs. While pilot projects have been built the technology is still only 
in the early stages of deployment and it is yet to be seen whether it can be effective on a 
large scale. To compensate for these unknowns, I chose to use a more conservative 
price of $450 per tonne for DAC in my modeling. This price also acts as a price ceiling 
for the carbon tax since emitters would choose to use DAC rather than pay the carbon 
tax if it was raised beyond $450 per tonne. If DAC is deployed at large scales its cost 
may fall as the technology matures and it benefits from economies of scale in 
production. At the same time however, it may become more expensive to store CO2 as 
the most suitable geological reservoirs would likely be filled first. Because there is 
significant uncertainty in how this dynamic may play out, I believe a DAC plus storage 
cost of $450 per tonne is a reasonable assumption to make.  
2.4.1. Reference 
The Ref policy package assumes Canada pursues measures similar to those already in 
place or announced in sufficient detail to model, such as federal carbon pricing and 
vehicle emission standards. It has been designed to serve as a baseline and show what 
Canadian emissions may look like if additional GHG mitigation measures are not taken. 
The case does not seek to model every Canadian climate-related policy as they are 
numerous and the addition of many of the smaller ones would only serve to complicate 
the model. I have also opted to not model detailed city-specific GHG policies as the 
version of CIMS used for this study functions at a provincial level and there is no way to 
separate emissions by municipalities. The two Ref cases are identical in their policy 
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composition and contain policies implemented at both the federal level and provincial 
levels. They are outlined below: 
 Federal: While there are several provincial carbon pricing plans in Canada along with a 
federal plan, I have chosen to lump them all together under the federal backstop 
program. The backstop price is set to follow the announced federal plan outlined in A 
Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy reaching $170/tonne by 2030 and then 
remaining there until 2050 (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020b). It is 
important to note this price on GHGs is expressed in nominal dollars and is lower after 
being adjusted for inflation. For transportation, I have included vehicle fuel efficiency 
standards like those applying to light-duty vehicles and heavy vehicles. The electricity 
sector is covered by federal regulations which limit the emissions intensity of electricity 
production to 420 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per Gigawatt hour. This measure is 
designed to phase out non-CCS coal generation by 2030 along with higher emission 
intensity natural gas units. 
 British Columbia: The electricity sector in BC is governed in part by the 2010 Clean 
Energy Act which requires 93% of the electricity in BC to come from non-emitting energy 
sources. This has been modeled and is assumed to hold constant throughout the 
projection period. The personal transportation sector in BC is subject to two separate 
regulations designed to lower its carbon intensity. The first is a zero-emissions vehicle 
mandate, which requires that 30% of vehicles sold within the province must be non-
emitting by 2030 and increase to 100% by 2040 as per the Zero-Emission Vehicles Act 
(2019). The second is a low carbon fuel standard, which is designed is to decrease the 
life cycle carbon intensity over time of carbon emitting fuels used in Canada. In addition 
to these fuel regulations, I implemented a measure that requires 15% of methane used in 
British Columbia to be renewably sourced by 2030 as stipulated by CleanBC. 
 Alberta: For Alberta, I modeled the Renewable Fuels Standard, which applies to gasoline 
and diesel and requires they be blended with renewably sourced fuels. I also modeled 
the planned phase-out of coal for electricity generation, which is set to occur by 2030. 
Additionally, I have included measures to reduce methane emissions from Alberta’s oil 
and gas sector which are designed to achieve reductions of 45% by 2025.  
 Saskatchewan: In Saskatchewan, I implemented the CCS retrofit of the 115 MW 
Boundary Dam coal power plant, which was completed in 2014. I also included their 
target of having 50% of their electricity capacity come from renewables sources by 2030.  
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 Manitoba: I included the phase-out of coal from Manitoba’s electricity sector, which was 
completed in 2010. 
 Ontario: I included the Ontario coal phase-out for electricity generation in my modeling, 
which was completed in 2014. 
 Quebec: In Quebec, I modeled the zero-emissions vehicle standard, which came into 
effect in 2018. This standard applies at different stringencies depending on the size of the 
automaker, but all levels come with the requirement that an increasing number of 
vehicles sold in Quebec be zero-emission. I have represented the requirement as 15.5% 
of new light-duty vehicles sold be zero emissions by 2025. 
 Atlantic: My modeling of the Territories and Atlantic Provinces included Nova Scotia’s 
electricity sector regulations, which put an emissions cap on the sector that falls to 2.5 Mt 
CO2 by 2050 and mandates that at least 40% of electricity generated in the province 
come from renewable sources by 2020. 
All provinces with biofuel blending mandates for gasoline and diesel were also modeled 
and can be seen in more detail in Appendix A2. I also included any energy efficiency and 
building regulations that were important in each of the provinces. Subsidy programs 
were not included in this case, as they often change quickly and may not deliver much in 
the way of emissions reductions due to the free-rider effect. 
2.4.2. Carbon Tax Cases 
The Carbon Tax (C Tax) cases rely on carbon pricing applied to all emissions in the 
Canadian economy to achieve reductions, with the intention of hitting net-zero emissions 
by 2050. While I call these Carbon Tax cases, they could just as easily be thought of as 
cap and trade systems, since they are modeled the same in CIMS. Under a cap and 
trade regime, the carbon price would represent the credit trading price, which would 
apply equally to all credits traded assuming efficient market functioning. The price 
trajectory follows the one set out in the Ref cases until 2025, after which the price begins 
to rise at $100 every five years until 2045. The price then rises $50 more to reach $450 
by 2050. The described carbon pricing applied to both combustion emissions from the 
burning of fossil fuels and process emissions produced through chemical reactions in 
both C Tax Global Action and C Tax Global Inaction. Revenues collected through 
emissions pricing are returned to the sectors they were collected from within each 
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province by enabling the revenue recycling function in CIMS. This was done to prevent 
carbon pricing from acting as a method for facilitating interprovincial or inter-sectoral 
transfers of revenues. Figure 3 shows the carbon tax schedules for the C Tax cases and 
the Ref cases. 
 
 
Figure 3: Carbon price in the C Tax cases and Ref cases 
 
As suggested by their name, products produced by emissions intensive trade exposed 
(EITE) industries contain a high level of embodied emissions and are subject to 
competition from other countries. If the production cost of these goods were to rise in 
any one country, that nation would likely lose market share to international competitors. 
This presents a challenge to decarbonization, as countries earnestly trying to 
decarbonize these industries may have their efforts defeated by competitors who lack 
strong climate regulations. 
In the Global Action scenario, this is not an issue as I assume all of the nations who 
compete with Canadian EITE industries will have equally stringent climate policies, 
which eliminates the risk of carbon leakage. This could be the result, for example, of a 
global agreement that includes a stringent carbon tariff mechanism to ensure universal 
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compliance. Or, it could be the result of ad hoc carbon tariffs by groups of countries who 
bind together in “climate clubs” such that eventually their trade pressures cause near-
universal adoption of equally stringent climate policies (Nordhaus, 2013; Victor, 2011). In 
this scenario, I cover all EITE industries with a carbon price, which rises to $450 per 
tonne, in an effort to drive decarbonization. In my modeling, I do not adjust the 
exogenously specified demand for any of these industries and I assume global demand 
for the products remains unchanged regardless of how much the price increases. One 
assumption embodied in this decision is the production costs of competing nations will 
rise at the same rate as they do in Canada, which was done to prevent EITE industries 
from moving away from Canada to regions with lower production costs. This dynamic 
may occur in the real world if competitor nations already have low emission intensity 
production or zero-emission production options cheaply available. But the shift could 
also go in the opposite direction since, because of its low-cost, low-emission hydropower 
endowment, Canada has low carbon intensity relative to competitors with some of its 
industrial products such as aluminum, metal smelting, pulp, and forest products. 
However, modeling such interactions would require detail on the EITE industries of 
competing nations and is beyond the scope of this study. 
In the Global Inaction scenario, I have taken measures to protect Canadian EITE 
industries from carbon leakage through the introduction of a three-tiered OBPS, which 
has different levels of carbon pricing based on how sensitive industry production costs 
are to emissions pricing. Carbon prices are applied to all emissions from these sectors, 
with the revenues collected being recycled back into the sectors they were taken from. 
The goal behind this decision was not to prevent any rise in the average production cost 
of EITE industries, but to hold the rise to below 15% through 2050 compared to the 
reference case of the Global Inaction scenario. Pricing schedules were created through 
an iterative process. I began by simulating a $450 per tonne carbon price on all EITE 
sectors then calculated the difference in production cost between the two policy Global 
Inaction cases and the Ref Global Inaction case. Next, I determined if any of the sectors 
saw a rise in production cost greater than 15%. I found most sectors saw rises in 
production costs less than 15%, with the two exceptions being the “other manufacturing” 
and “industrial minerals” sectors. Based on these findings I created a tiered system 
where sectors more sensitive to carbon pricing were covered by a lower carbon price. 




Figure 4: OBPS price tiers in the Global Inaction case 
 
The industrial minerals sector is in the High Exposure tier with the lowest price, which 
rises at a steady rate from 2025 to 2045, before plateauing at $135 per tonne. The other 
manufacturing sector is in the Moderate Exposure tier and faces a price that steadily 
rises to $340 per tonne in 20505. The pricing in the Low Exposure tier follows the same 
schedule as the regular carbon tax and covers the rest of the EITE industries rising to 
$450 per tonne by 2050. Table 3 outlines the price of each OBPS tier and which 
industries they apply to.  
Sectors like iron and steel, and chemical products that I placed in the Low Exposure tier 
may be less sensitive to carbon pricing than those in the higher tiers because they have 
lower cost decarbonization options available. These technologies may not be commonly 
used at present or may be expected to become commercially available in the near 
 
5 The Other Manufacturing sector lacks the same level of technological detail as other industrial 
sectors in CIMS. This lower resolution may explain why it is more sensitive to carbon pricing than 
more detailed sectors like the Iron and Steel. 
38 
future. Alternatively, this low sensitivity to carbon pricing could be an indication that 
CIMS lacks sufficient detail in these sectors which results in technological change 
occurring too easily.  
The tiered OBPS was designed to prevent high-intensity industries from shifting 
overseas to jurisdictions with weak climate policies through carbon leakage. If this were 
to occur, global emissions would not be reduced and Canada would suffer economic 
losses. Another option for addressing the carbon leakage concern would be to 
implement carbon border tariffs on products coming from jurisdictions without sufficiently 
stringent climate policies. While this would protect domestic sales, it still leaves 
Canadian products at a disadvantage when competing against carbon intensive 
alternatives on international markets. In my study I have opted to not model carbon 
border tariffs as they have not yet been implemented anywhere in the world and would 
require assumptions about the carbon intensity of imported products. 
 
 
Table 3: OBPS tiers used in the Flex Regs and C Tax Global Inaction cases, with 2050 emissions 
prices 
 
2.4.3. Flexible Regulations Cases 
Rather than using a single policy tool, the two analyzed Flexible Regulations (Flex Regs) 
cases rely on a mixture of regulations and an OBPS to achieve emissions reductions. 
The design of Flex Regs focused on improving political acceptability compared to the C 
Tax case, while also trying to minimize any reductions in economic efficiency. The 
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regulations are designed in a way that gives emitters as much choice as possible in how 
they are met, rather than mandating the use of specific technologies. This was done to 
improve the economic efficiency of the policy package and to avoid restricting 
purchasing decisions unnecessarily. A key design aspect of these regulations is that 
they target the source of GHG emissions as directly as possible in an attempt to mimic 
the precision of a carbon tax. Part of the reason why carbon pricing is an effective 
method of abatement is because it puts a price directly on the pollutant, which increases 
its cost and corrects for externalities. With regulations, we lack the same level of 
precision, but we can try to get as close as possible. In following this principle, I chose to 
target GHG emitting fuels where I could and set regulations that limited their use. These 
regulations are applied to all GHG fuels in the sectors where they were implemented. If 
only one emitting fuel source was regulated, consumers may substitute the regulated 
one with a non-regulated one, thereby defeating the spirit of the regulation. In instances 
where it was not possible to implement regulations on carbon-intensive fuels, I instead 
regulated emitting technologies. 
Rather than design a new set of regulations for the electricity, hydrogen, and industrial 
sectors for these cases, I instead chose to regulate their emission through the same 
OBPS used in the C Tax cases. This choice was made because the current OBPS has 
so far proven both politically acceptable and economically efficient. Replacing it with an 
alternative may decrease either political acceptability or economic efficiency, which 
leaves little motivation to replace it in the two Flex Regs cases.  
Commercial and Residential 
The majority of emissions from the residential and commercial sectors come from the 
use of natural gas in heating applications. To reduce emissions in these sectors, I 
implemented a regulation requiring an increasing amount of biomethane to be blended 
with natural gas. This requirement is based on a similar blending mandate being created 
under the CleanBC policy package in British Columbia, although the one used in my is 
applied to all provinces. Required blending begins at 20% in 2030 and rises smoothly 
until it reaches 100% in 2050. Flexibility is provided because the regulation does not 
prescribe the use of biomethane in a building, but rather it disallows the use of natural 
gas. Building owners and operators have the option of using biomethane for heating or 
instead using electric devices, like heat pumps and resistance heaters, or perhaps fuel 
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cells that use hydrogen produced in zero-emission processes. A portion of residential 
and commercial emissions also come from the use of propane and fuel oil. Rather than 
require these fuels to be blended with a low carbon alternative, I instead phase out their 
use through a regulation mandating they can no longer be sold past 2025. 
Transportation 
In the personal transportation sector, I modeled regulations requiring an increasing 
amount of gasoline to be blended with ethanol. This mandate requires 20% ethanol 
blending by 2030, rising to 100% by 2050 in both Flex Regs. Because regular gasoline 
motors cannot use blends with higher levels of ethanol, I disallow their sale after 2025. 
While they may not achieve the same level of cost-effectiveness as a carbon tax, 
research indicates these types of regulations can provide relatively low-cost emissions 
reductions (Vass & Jaccard, 2017; Rivers & Wigle, 2018). 
Buses and rail, which provide public transit services, have regulations designed to phase 
out emitting technologies rather than target their fuel sources directly. To model this, I 
mandated new sales of public transit options running on fossil fuels fall to zero by 
between 2030 and 2035. Zero-emission vehicles running on electricity, biodiesel, or 
hydrogen were allowed to compete for market share, which provides flexibility in how 
this regulation was met. In my study, I did not model regulations applying to aircraft or 
ships due to the international nature of their travel and the risk of carbon leakage. 
However, a comprehensive net-neutral carbon plan would include policies targeting 
these sources of emissions.   
In the freight transportation sector, heavy-duty vehicles running on diesel account for the 
majority of sectoral emissions. To drive reductions, I modeled regulations requiring an 
increasing share of the diesel sold to the sector to be blended with biodiesel or HDRD. In 
the Flex Regs Global Action case, this value reaches 60% by 2050 and in the Flex Regs 
Global Inaction case 100% by 2050. While conventional biodiesel cannot be blended 
with regular diesel in excess of 20% in many modern engines, I assume next-generation 
diesel engines will be able to tolerate these higher blending rates. To model this 
evolution, I disallowed the sale of standard diesel engines beginning in 2025. Similar 
regulations are also applied to freight vehicles fueled by compressed natural gas, but for 
these I require an increasing share of their fuel to be provided by biomethane. This rises 
at the same rate in both Flex Regs cases, beginning at 20% in 2030 and reaching 100% 
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in 2050. With the phasing out of diesel and natural gas as fuel options, flexibility is still 
available as purchasers can choose to use biomethane, biodiesel, hydrogen, or 
electrically powered vehicles. 
Biodiesel and Ethanol Production 
With regulations in place to induce switching away from fossil fuels towards low carbon 
fuels, it is important to ensure these low carbon fuels are produced with as few 
emissions as possible. In ethanol and biodiesel production, I implemented regulations 
requiring the boilers and cogeneration units providing heat not to use coal beginning in 
2025 in both Flex Regs cases. I also added a requirement where biomethane had to 
account for an increasing share of the methane used in the sector resulting in 
biomethane completely replacing natural gas by 2050. In addition, I also regulated the 
use of diesel in the production process of these biofuels, with the share of biodiesel 
needing to be blended with conventional diesel reaching 10% in the Flex Regs Global 
Action scenario and 20% in the Global Inaction scenario by 2050. These values were 
chosen to mimic the biodiesel blending rates achieved under the two carbon pricing 
scenarios. 
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Chapter 3. Results and Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to explore two possible policy pathways Canada could 
take in efforts to achieve domestic carbon neutrality by 2050. My analysis compares four 
net-zero cases which are designed to hit net zero (C Tax Global Action, C Tax Global 
Inaction, Flex Regs Global Action, Flex Regs Global Inaction) with two reference cases 
(Ref Global Action, Ref Global Inaction) and assesses technological change, energy 
change and GHG emissions depending on scenarios, regions and sectors. I focus 
especially on differences in the results between the cases I modeled in the year 2050. 
Similar results in terms of technology shares and sectoral emissions between the Flex 
Regs and C Tax cases were created intentionally, with a greater degree of similarity 
between the two indicating that my regulatory packages would not diverge dramatically 
from carbon tax in terms of the economic impacts. 
3.1. National Results 
In all six of the cases, my policy simulations indicate significant declines in emissions 
may occur by 2050 compared to 2005 levels, with their trajectories illustrated by Figure 
5. My simulation indicates emissions from the Ref Global Action case may fall to 26% 
below 2005 levels (544 Mt) and the Ref Global Inaction may fall to 19% below 2005 
levels by 2050 (599 Mt). This suggests the accelerated cost declines for low emissions 
technologies combined with lower output from the Canadian oil sector could induce 55 
Mt of additional emissions reductions. At the same time, these effects could offset any 
increases in demand for RPPs induced by the $40 per barrel oil price in the Global 
Action scenario. While these cases show improvement from 2005 levels, they are both 
likely fall well short of the carbon neutrality goal6.  
 
 
6 All cases in this study miss Canada’s Paris Agreement commitment to reduce 2030 emissions 
to 30% below 2005 levels. Meeting this target was not part of my study and as such will not be 





Figure 5: Net GHG emissions by case 
 
Unlike the two reference cases, the four net-zero cases in the study are specifically 
designed to approach carbon neutrality by 2050 and unsurprisingly my simulation 
generates far greater reductions. Emissions in the net-zero cases could fall by between 
78% (160 Mt) in the Flex Regs Global Inaction case and 74% (189 Mt) in the C Tax 
Global Action case by 2050. It appears the lower price for RPPs in the Global Action 
scenario may be able to completely offset any additional reductions induced by lower 
Canadian oil production and the accelerated cost decline of low carbon technologies.  
While none of these simulated cases reach zero total emissions, I assume the remaining 
emissions could be offset by negative emissions technologies such as DAC, which, as 
noted, I did not explicitly model in this study. 
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3.2. Provincial Results  
As we would expect, emissions from my simulated net-zero cases are lower than those 
from the Ref cases across all regions of Canada. My modeling suggests all regions 
could see emissions decrease by at least 48% in the net-zero cases compared to the 
Ref cases by 2050. Of all the provinces, British Columbia may see the smallest 
decrease in total emissions in the net-zero cases compared to the Ref cases, with total 
emissions 48% lower in the net-zero cases. My simulations indicate Alberta may see the 
largest difference between the net-zero and Ref cases, with sector differences ranging 
from 89% to over 100% in instances where emissions in the sector become net 
negative. Alberta is likely to be the region most impacted by the lower oil production, with 
simulated emissions much lower in the Ref Global Action case than the Ref Global 
Inaction case. Some other provinces, such as Ontario, could see small increases in 
emissions in the Global Action cases, which is likely due to the lower price for RPPs 
leading to higher consumption of gasoline and diesel. All net-zero cases indicate Ontario 
could replace Alberta as the largest GHG emitter, followed by British Columbia and 
Quebec, while Alberta goes from being one of the largest emitters to one of the smallest. 
This change of roles may seem odd, but it can be partially explained by two factors. 
First, Alberta and Saskatchewan were the only two provinces where the adoption of 
negative emissions BECCS units was permitted because of the highly favourable 
conditions for this option in those two provinces. If BECCS is capturing a significant 
amount of market share in the electricity sector, these negative emissions could offset a 
sizable amount of emissions from other sectors. Second, Alberta has a carbon-intensive 
economy and may have have more options available for low cost decarbonization 
compared to regions like British Columbia or Quebec with low carbon intensity 
economies. Figure 6 shows the 2050 emissions from each of the 6 simulated cases in 
this study for each of the regions studied. 
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Figure 6: Emissions from each region in CIMS by 2050 
 
46 
3.3. Sectoral Results 
The following section describes changes in emissions from the economic sectors in 
CIMS. A summary of these simulated changes is shown in Figure 7, where 2050 
emissions are separated by case and sector. 
 
Figure 7: Canadian GHG emissions by case and sector in 2050 
 
3.3.1. Industrial Emissions 
In 2005, industrial emissions made up about one-third of the emissions produced by 
Canada (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a). Since then, this share has 
been growing as emissions from non-industrial sectors have been falling while those 
from industry have been rising. My modeled net-zero cases indicate this may trend may 
continue. In the Global Inaction cases, it is possible industrial emissions could make up 
over 70% of Canada’s total 2050 emissions, while they may only make up around 45% 
in the Global Action cases. The difference can be attributed to two main factors: the 
protection of price sensitive EITE industries in the Global Inaction scenario, and the 
lower output from oil related sectors in the Global Action scenario. 
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Since my policy packages try to avoid inducing carbon leakage, I ensured the production 
costs of EITE industries did not rise more than 15%. These actions were only used in the 
Global Inaction net-zero cases and are explained in detail in the Methods section. My 
modeling revealed that most sectors may see their output costs rise by less than 15% 
under the $450 per tonne carbon price used in the OBPS, with the two exceptions being 
the other manufacturing and industrial minerals sectors. Of these two sectors, industrial 
minerals was likely to be more sensitive and received a lower carbon price, rising to 
$135 per tonne by 2050, while the price for other manufacturing rose to $340 per tonne 
by 2050. As a result of this less aggressive carbon pricing schedule, my modeling 
suggests emissions from these industrial sectors may be higher in the Global Inaction 
scenario cases compared to the Global Action scenario cases. In the industrial minerals 
sector, modeling indicates annual emission could fall to 4 Mt in the two Global Action 
cases, and to 12 Mt in the Global Inaction cases.  
As was the case for industrial minerals, emissions in my simulation from the other 
manufacturing sector fell less in the two Global Inaction scenario net-zero cases than 
they did in the Global Action net-zero cases. Emissions in both C Tax Global Inaction 
and Flex Regs Global Inaction were simulated to be be 20 Mt in 2050, the same as they 
were in 2005, while they could fall to 14 Mt in C Tax Action and Flex Regs Action. Even 
though the other manufacturing sector emissions were the same as in 2005 in the Global 
Inaction net-zero cases, this does not mean the implemented OBPS was ineffectual, as 
they rise by 7 Mt in both Ref cases compared to 2005 levels in my simulations. 
My modeling indicates the petroleum crude extraction sector could see the largest 
difference in emissions between the two scenarios, even though both applied the same 
OBPS price, which rose to $450 per tonne by 2050. This is not surprising, as the 2050 
Global Action scenario demand from the sector is assumed to be half of 2020 levels and 
one-third of the Global Inaction scenario levels. In both of the Global Action policy 
scenarios, emissions from the sector are simulated to fall to about 12 Mt by 2050, which 
is about 20 Mt lower than those my simulation produced in the Global Inaction policy 
scenarios. My modeling also indicated there could be a significant difference in the 
emission from the sector between the two reference cases, again due to the large 
differences in oil price and demand between the scenarios. In the Ref Global Action 
case, emissions may fall to 34 Mt by 2050 compared to Ref Global Inaction where they 
may increase to 97 Mt from 77 Mt in 2005. It is interesting to note that simulated sectoral 
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emissions from the Ref Global Action case are similar to emissions from both Global 
Inaction net-zero cases. This emphasises the impact climate action taken by the rest of 
the world could have on the Canadian oil sector. 
 
Figure 8: Emissions EITE sectors in 2050 in all six cases. *Emissions from Petroleum Crude 
Extraction reach 97 Mt in the Ref Global Inaction case, although this chart has been truncated for 
clarity. 
 
The petroleum refining sector is closely related to petroleum crude extraction, and had 
the same OBPS price schedule implemented. My modeling suggests a notably larger 
decrease in emissions may occur in the Global Action cases compared to the Global 
Inaction cases. In the two Global Action net-zero cases, emissions could fall from 20 Mt 
in 2020 to 6 Mt by 2050. Under the Global Inaction net-zero cases, emissions could fall 
to 9 Mt, which still represents a large decrease from their peak even though this is 50% 
larger than in Global Action net-zero cases. The two Ref cases could follow similar 
trends to those in the petroleum extraction sector, with emissions in the Ref Global 
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Inaction case possibly falling only slightly to 20 Mt and Ref Global Action possible 
declining more sharply to 12 Mt by 2050. 
In all non-petroleum EITE sectors (chemical products, iron and steel, metal smelting, 
mineral mining, and paper manufacturing) my modeling suggests there would be little 
difference in emissions between the two scenarios, with emissions potentially falling in 
all net-zero cases by between 50% and 70% compared to 2005 levels. These reductions 
are driven by the most stringent OBPS tier, which rises to $450/tonne by 2050. 
Emissions declines from these sectors are likely to be to be smaller in the reference 
cases where reductions only occur in the metal smelting and chemical products sectors 
and increase in the other three sectors in both the Global Inaction and Global Action 
scenarios. 
3.3.2. Electricity 
From 2005 to 2018 emissions from the Canadian electricity sector fell by close to 50%, 
driven by decarbonization efforts such as the phase-out of coal electricity generation in 
Ontario (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2020a) In all of my cases, this could 
possibly trend continues. As expected, modeling suggests the two reference cases are 
likely to see the smallest decrease in emissions, falling to around 40 Mt a year by 2050 
in the Global Inaction scenario and 57 Mt in the Global Action scenario, as compared to 
119 Mt in 2005. Reductions would be driven by current policies, like the federal phase-
out of high emissions intensity generation units and the planned rising carbon price. The 
higher levels of emissions in Ref Global Action would be due to the higher demand for 
electricity, which would be likely driven by the accelerated cost decline of EVs. In the 
net-zero cases, modeling suggests these much greater reductions could be largely due 
to negative emissions technologies. Simulated emission trends in the electricity sector 





Figure 9: Net annual GHG emissions from the Canadian electricity sector 
 
In all four net-zero cases, modeling suggests electricity sector emissions could fall well 
below 0 Mt per year with the C Tax Global Action case falling to -36 Mt, the Flex Regs 
Global Action case to -52 Mt, the C Tax Global Inaction to -61 Mt and, the Flex Regs 
Global Inaction to -57 Mt. These negative emissions could be created by BECCS units in 
Alberta and Saskatchewan, with those provinces accounting for all of the negative 
emissions in the Canadian electricity sector in my simulation. Alberta could play an 
especially important role with net electricity sector emissions falling as low as -74 Mt in 
the C Tax Global Inaction case. This is in line with other studies, which have found that 
the negative emissions produced by BECCS could provide an important role in offsetting 
emission from other sectors (Hilaire et al., 2019; Selosse & Ricci, 2014). Without strong 
policy support, these plants are likely to be more expensive than other generation 
options and thus do not capture any market share in the modeled reference cases. In my 
net-zero cases, I assume the federal government either pays firms a rate equal to the 
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carbon price for storing carbon or allows other firms to pay negative emitters to offset 
their emissions. Despite the electricity sector as a whole reaching negative emissions, 
modeling suggests some emitting technologies could capture market share even with 
$450/tonne carbon pricing. These are mainly peaking combined-cycle natural gas 
powerplants in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. Other regions could use 
dispatchable hydropower to cover peak electricity demand rather than natural gas 
generation. 
While the carbon pricing mechanisms in my study may not be not stringent enough to 
abate these remaining electricity sector emissions, this does not mean there are no 
options for addressing them. Research by the Canadian Energy Research Institute 
(2019) has indicated the expansion of interprovincial electricity trade between Alberta 
and British Columbia, and Manitoba and Saskatchewan could provide a valuable 
decarbonization pathway. The peaking electricity generation capacity of both British 
Columbia and Manitoba is largely composed of zero-emission hydro resources making 
them ideal partners for replacing the natural gas used in Alberta and Saskatchewan to 
ensure system reliability as the contribution of non-dispatchable wind and solar 
increases. The expansion of interprovincial transmission was not included in this study 
as it may be difficult to achieve without strong cooperation between provincial 
governments.  
An interesting dynamic could occur in the electricity sectors of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, which may result in noticeably lower sectoral emissions in both of the 
Global Inaction net-zero cases compared to their Global Action counterparts. The root 
cause of this is the lower output from the oil sectors of Alberta and Saskatchewan which, 
by 2050, is two-thirds lower in the Global Action scenario than the Global Inaction 
scenario. Lower oil output in turn could cause the demand for electricity in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan to be lower since there would be less industrial activity overall. Since 
emissions from the electricity sector as a whole would be negative, a smaller electricity 
sector would produce fewer negative emissions assuming the relative technology market 
shares remain the same. This may not however be a realistic dynamic and may prompt 
a rethinking of how BECCS and possibly other carbon negative technologies should be 
modeled. 
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My modeling suggests BECCS units could achieve a negative production cost with the 
$450 per tonne carbon price in place. We should interpret this as indicating that the 
action of storing CO2 itself would be profitable even if companies storing the CO2 are 
not selling any electricity or are being paid $0 for what they generate. Therefore, the 
amount of electricity produced by BECCS should be determined independently of the 
amount of electricity demanded by the Albertan electricity grid. Instead, it should be 
mainly determined by the cost of CCS, the price of biomass, and the unit price paid for 
carbon storage. This same dynamic already occurs in the Albertan oil sands at 
cogeneration facilities that produce electricity as part of the heavy oil extraction process. 
The price of electricity is irrelevant to how much electricity is produced by these 
cogeneration units, which is instead determined by the price of oil. One can think of 
BECCS facilities in the same way. Instead of power plants that also store CO2, they 
should be viewed as CO2 storage facilities that can produce electricity as a co-product. 
This view makes the amount of BECCS adopted by the Albertan electricity grid 
independent from other provincial economic dynamics, like the amount of oil produced in 
the province. I expect this would result in electricity sector emissions being similar 
across the two scenarios even with different levels of industrial electricity demand. 
3.3.3. Residential and Commercial 
Figure 10 shows the simulated decline in emissions from the residential and commercial 
sectors in all six cases. In each case, I find the simulated residential and commercial 
sectors may see significant declines in their emissions, with the residential sector 
dropping to below 2 Mt in all cases and the commercial sector below 15 Mt. Residential 
emissions mainly come from home heating devices such as furnaces or water heaters 
fueled by natural gas or heating oil. In all cases, modeling suggests these devices could 
be mainly replaced by a mix of biomethane fueled furnaces, electric heat pumps, and 
electric resistance heaters. This represents a large shift in the current energy mix of the 
Canadian residential sector, which was comprised of 46% natural gas and 38% 
electricity in 2018 with most of the rest coming from heating oil, propane, and wood 
(Natural Resources Canada, 2021). The market shares that each technology could 
capture vary from province to province, with provinces having higher electricity prices, 




Figure 10: 2050 GHG emissions from the residential and residential sectors by case 
 
Emissions from the commercial sector may also see a steep decline in all cases. The 
sector does not not fully decarbonize in the simulated reference cases, leaving between 
9 and 13 Mt remaining by 2050, but emissions in the four net-zero cases fall to close to 0 
Mt in my modeling. Like the residential sector, decarbonization of the commercial sector 
could be done through the replacement of natural gas, propane, or light fuel oil heating 
units with those using biomethane or electricity. By 2050, simulations suggest the 
amount of energy provided by electricity in the commercial sector could increase from 
46% in 2018 to between 54% and 61% in all of the net-zero cases, with biomethane 
possibly capturing the rest. My modeling suggests there may be a slight uptick in 
emissions from the commercial sector after hitting its low in 2040 in the two Ref cases. 
This is likely caused by the decreasing real value of the reference case carbon price, 
which has been adjusted downward for inflation since the government has not specified 
that the price would be corrected for inflation effects. Table 4 shows the market shares 
each energy source captures in the six modeled cases in the commercial sector along 
with 2018 market shares. 
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Table 4: Fuel Energy shares in the residential and commercial sectors for all of Canada in 2018 
and 2050 
 
The high level of decarbonization seen in the Ref cases of this study indicates that the 
residential and, to a lesser extent, the commercial sector could provide low abatement 
cost options for decarbonization. This information is useful to policymakers looking to 
achieve carbon neutrality, as it provides them with an idea of what sectors could be 
quickly decarbonized. In a situation where an economy wide carbon price was being 
used to drive emissions, these results would be less important. However, if regulations 
were being used, analysis suggests these two sectors would be a good place to 
implement policies first. Additionally, the residential and commercial sectors are not 
trade-exposed, as increasing the price of home and building temperature regulation is 
unlikely to lead to carbon leakage or hurt the international competitiveness of Canadian 
industries. 
3.3.4. Personal Transportation 
My modeling suggests emissions from the personal transportation sector could decrease 
in all cases, although decreases are likely to be much smaller in the reference cases 
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than in the net-zero cases. 2050 emissions in the Ref Global Action case could be 29% 
lower than 2005 levels and emissions from the Ref Global Inaction case could be 33% 
lower. Even though the cost decline for EVs has been accelerated in the Global Action 
scenario this may not result in significantly higher uptake as EVs capture about 20% of 
total market share by 2050 in both reference cases of my simulation. The negligible 
difference in EV market share between these two cases is likely due to the lower price of 
gasoline in the Global Action scenario which offsets the lower EV price in the scenario. 
The other approximately 80% of passenger vehicles in my simulation consists of hybrids 
using gasoline blended with low levels of ethanol, which may not rise above the blending 
levels required by policy.  
My simulation indicates 2050 emissions in the C Tax Global Inaction case could be 59% 
below 2005 levels while those in C Tax Global Action could be 64% lower. Unlike in the 
reference cases, this seems to indicate the accelerated cost declines for EVs is enough 
to offset the lower gasoline price of the Global Action scenario, leading to lower 
emissions. The market shares for EVs reflect this as modeling indicates they could be 
14% higher in the C Tax Global Action case than C Tax Global Inaction. Regulations I 
use in the Flex Regs cases require the ethanol blending rate with gasoline to reach 
100% by 2050. With this regulation in place, EV adoption could reach 85% in the Global 
Action scenario and 78% in the Global Inaction scenario. Table 5 contains a full list of 
modeled passenger vehicle motor market shares in 2050. 




3.3.5. Freight Transportation 
My modeling indicates emissions from the transportation freight sector may vary greatly 
between the four policy and two reference cases, with emissions from the reference 
cases possibly being significantly higher. In the Ref Global Inaction case, emissions 
could almost double from 94 Mt in 2005 to 173 Mt in 2050, driven by significant 
increases in the shipment of goods and insufficiently stringent policies. The outlook in 
the Ref Global Action case could be similar with emissions rising to 167 Mt by 2050. 
Emissions in both of the Global Inaction net-zero cases could fall below 30 Mt by 2050, 
with the C Tax Global Inaction possibly reaching 24 Mt and Flex Regs Global Inaction at 
14 Mt. Both may be significantly lower than the emission from the Action scenarios, 
which could fall to 84 in the Flex Regs Action case and 78 in C Tax Action. Within the 
land freight sector in CIMS, trucks are broken down into two categories, light-medium 
motors and heavy motors. Table 6 provides a breakdown of how much market share is 
captured by each engine type in the heavy motors and light-medium motors of the freight 
sector in my simulation. 
Table 6: Light-medium and heavy motor market shares of all six cases in 2050 
 
The accelerated cost declines for electric light-medium motors could make a large 
difference in possible adoption of the technology in all cases, with market shares 
potentially being between 39% and 54% higher in the Global Action scenario compared 
to Global Inaction. The faster cost decline for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles could also 
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make a noticeable difference, although it is likely smaller than the impact of the electric 
light-medium motors. My simulations suggest hydrogen fuel cells in heavy freight trucks 
could capture between 23% and 54% in the Global Action scenario, while they may only 
capture between 0% and 11% in the Global Inaction scenario. This wide gap in adoption 
between the two scenarios is not an unexpected result as I noted there was significant 
disagreement in previous net-zero studies on the role hydrogen trucks may play. On the 
high end of this range the Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) estimates 
hydrogen trucks could capture up to 64% of market share. At the low end the 
Government of Canada (2016) estimates they might only make up 5% in one of its 
cases.  
Emissions from the freight transportation sector could be very different between the two 
scenarios, with Global Action scenario emissions being much higher. My simulation 
indicates this could occur despite the accelerated cost declines for hydrogen and electric 
trucks in the Global Action scenario, which may result in them capturing larger market 
shares in all cases. It appears the lower cost of oil and RPPs in the Global Action case 
could offset the faster cost declines and allow diesel to maintain a significant market 
share. The dynamic is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows the % of total liquid fuels that 
could be made up of diesel and biodiesel/HDRD in the C Tax Global Inaction (left) and C 
Tax Global Action (right) cases. In my simulation of the C Tax Global Inaction case, the 
share captured by biodiesel/HDRD may rise slowly until 2035 when it reaches 8% 
market share. After 2035, it could capture large market shares in each of the following 
periods before reaching 87% in 2050. The C Tax Global Action case may see a more 
gradual uptake of biodiesel and only reach 8% by 2040. After 2040, there could be an 
accelerated uptake that reaches 57% by 2050, as suggested by my modeling. This 
difference in biodiesel/HDRD uptake between these two cases appears to be enough to 






Figure 11: Share of liquid fuels provided by biodiesel/HDRD and diesel in the C Tax Global 
Inaction and C Tax Global Cases 
 
3.3.6. Low Carbon Fuel Sectors 
The low carbon fuels that I represent with discrete production sectors in the version of 
CIMS I used for this study are biodiesel, ethanol, and hydrogen. Figure 12 lists the 
simulated 2050 emissions from these three sectors. Unlike most of the other sectors in 
this study, my simulation suggests emissions from the biodiesel sector could be higher in 
the net-zero cases than in the reference cases. In both of the reference cases, simulated 
emissions are 2 Mt per year, and between 13 and 35 Mt in the net-zero cases. This is 
due to the demand for biodiesel which is much higher in the net-zero cases than in the 
reference cases. According to my modeling, emissions from the biodiesel sector could 
also be higher in the Global Inaction scenario net-zero cases compared to their Global 
Action counterparts. I suspect this difference is due to the lower demand for biodiesel 
from the freight sector in the Global Action net-zero cases which was explained in the 
previous section. Emissions in the biodiesel sector come from the use of natural gas and 
diesel in the production process. While diesel could still used in the net-zero cases, 
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natural gas may be completely phased out and replaced by either biomethane or 
processes using electricity as an energy source. The diesel in this sector is used in the 
agricultural production of the feedstock material. In my simulations, some biodiesel 
endogenously replaces conventional diesel in agricultural input production, but it only 
captures 10% of the market share in the C Tax Global Action case and 20% in the C Tax 
Global Inaction case by 2050. The policies used in the Flex Regs cases were designed 
to approximate these results, which can explain why the production of biodiesel does not 
fall to zero emission in any modeled case. 
 
 
Figure 12: Emissions from the Biodiesel, Ethanol, and Hydrogen sectors in 2050 in all six cases 
 
My modeling suggests emissions from the ethanol sector might not rise above 2 Mt in 
any of the cases, with emissions peaking between 2020 and 2030 for all cases then 
falling below 1 Mt by 2050. Even with stringent carbon pricing in place, ethanol may not 
capture market share above what is mandated in the personal transportation sector.7 In 
 
7 See Appendix A Table A1 for reference case transportation biofuel blending requirements. 
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the Flex Regs cases, ethanol is mandated to replace 100% of gasoline used in the 
personal transportation sector, although this might not lead to higher ethanol 
consumption. Instead, there may be a sizeable shift away from internal combustion 
engines to EVs, which could keep ethanol consumption at similar levels between the 
net-zero cases. 
Simulations indicate emissions from the hydrogen sector could vary greatly from case to 
case due to the differences in the policy stringency and the cost of hydrogen using 
technologies, namely hydrogen heavy freight trucks. In the reference cases, simulated 
emissions from the hydrogen sector reach 5 Mt in the Global Action scenario and 2 Mt in 
the Global Inaction scenario. The hydrogen sector faces the same carbon price in both 
of these modeled cases, with the difference in emission stemming from the higher 
demand for hydrogen caused by the lower cost of hydrogen trucks in the Ref Global 
Action case. As part of the Global Action scenario, I accelerated the cost decline of 
electrolysers, although simulations indicate they still may not see uptake in any of my 
cases, with all market share being captured by methane steam reforming with CCS. In 
all four of the net-zero cases, total emissions could become negative for the hydrogen 
sector as a whole.  
This result can be attributed to the combined use of biomethane and CCS in the 
manufacture of hydrogen using methane steam reforming, which has net negative 
emissions in my model. Like with all negative emissions technologies in my study I 
assumed payments are made to producers of negative emissions in the hydrogen sector 
at a rate equal to the regular carbon price. With producers receiving this payment, using 
biomethane in methane steam reforming plus CCS may be able to capture roughly 15% 
market share in all net-zero cases. The remaining 85% could be taken by methane 
steam reforming using fossil fuel natural gas and equipped with CCS according to my 
simulations. As a result, emissions may fall to between -4 and -2 Mt in all net-zero 
cases, with the lowest values being in the Global Action scenario.  
A recent report by Larson et al. (2020) suggests hydrogen produced through negative 
emissions pathways could be important in American decarbonization, so it stands to 
reason it could play a role in Canadian decarbonization as well. It should however be 
noted the price of biomethane is not endogenously calculated in CIMS and instead relies 
on an exogenously specified price, which does not respond to market dynamics. Future 
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researchers may wish to develop supply curves or production sectors for biomethane to 




Chapter 4. Conclusions 
4.1. Summary of Findings 
The goal of my research is to explore potential policy pathways Canada could take to 
approach carbon neutrality by 2050 and help fill the knowledge gap surrounding this 
undertaking. Using an energy-economy model, I simulated six cases: a reference case 
(Reference) and two net-zero cases (Carbon Tax and Flexible Regulations), in two 
different global scenarios (Global Inaction and Global Action) designed to illustrate 
different levels of global climate action. The net-zero cases I developed in this study 
provide two contrasting examples of how carbon neutrality could be achieved in Canada. 
All of the modeling work in my research was conducted using the CIMS energy-economy 
model. 
Through my work, I have shown net-zero GHG emissions may be approached through a 
mix of flexibly designed regulations or economy-wide carbon pricing. In all of my net-
zero cases, emissions could fall to below 200 Mt CO2e per year, with the remaining 
emissions possibly offset by negative emissions technologies. The results from my 
research also indicate the current suite of announced and planned Canadian climate 
policies may be unable to achieve carbon neutrality, as emissions do not fall below 500 
Mt in either Ref case. 
In this study, I also assessed which emissions might be more difficult to abate and which 
may be done more cheaply. Emissions from the commercial and residential sectors 
appear to offer the cheapest avenues for emissions abatement of the sectors where I 
applied the full carbon price. In all of my net-zero cases emissions from the residential 
and commercial sectors may fall to near zero. In the Ref cases annual emissions from 
the residential sector could fall to 2 Mt in both scenarios and below 15 Mt in the 
commercial sector.  
Emissions from the industrial minerals sector may be hard to abate even with higher 
carbon prices, as processes like cement production emit GHGs as part of important 
chemical reactions which have to be abated by expensive alternative production 
methods or carbon capture and storage. This was illustrated by the sharp rise in 
production cost when carbon pricing was implemented. To prevent carbon leakage, I 
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chose to use a less stringent OBPS price in the Global Inaction case, which brought 
down production costs but also resulted in more sectoral emissions. The same situation 
played out in the other manufacturing sector, but to a lesser extent. While these sectors 
may be difficult to decarbonize, this does not mean achieving carbon neutrality is 
impossible, but it does suggest their emissions may need to be offset by negative 
emissions or enabled by a wider application of carbon capture and storage than I 
allowed in my modeling assumptions. 
The differing emissions outcomes in my two scenarios suggest the level of climate action 
undertaken by the rest of the world will have impacts on Canadian emissions. If the 
world acts together on climate change, emissions from the Canadian oil sector will likely 
fall due to lower demand for Canadian hydrocarbon products and the associated lower 
oil price, and lower Canadian oil production. In my Global Action scenario, 
decarbonization is accelerated in some sectors by the faster development of low carbon 
end-use technologies, such as EVs, which benefit from a larger global market and 
increased investment. On the other hand, my work suggests lower oil prices will lead to 
lower prices for fuels such as gasoline and diesel and may keep them cost-competitive 
longer with low-emission options. Even in the presence of stringent carbon pricing, I 
found these carbon-intensive fuels were able to capture sizeable market share in the 
Global Action scenario cases, especially in the freight transportation sector. 
If Canada were to act alone or with only a subset of leader countries in tackling climate 
change, as in the Global Inaction scenario, a key concern would be ensuring our EITE 
industries remain internationally competitive to not induce carbon leakage while also 
decarbonizing. My modeling indicates this is possible to achieve if the necessary policies 
are enacted.  This is demonstrated by significant emission reductions in the Global 
Inaction scenario net-zero cases, which could be 15-20 Mt greater than what is seen in 
the Global Action scenario net-zero cases despite Global Inaction’s weaker OBPS.  
In my study, emissions negative technologies proved to be important for Canadian 
decarbonization. BECCS could be especially important as it was responsible for 
transforming the Canadian electricity sector from significant contributor of emissions to a 
GHG sink. The production of hydrogen may also be an emissions sink, as the hydrogen 
production sector contributed negative emissions in all of my policy scenarios due to the 
use of biomethane and CCS in methane steam reforming. 
64 
4.2. Limitations and Future Research 
The transition to carbon neutrality by 2050 represents a major shift for the Canadian 
economy over a three-decade horizon. While I attempted to capture the most important 
dynamics at play in this transition, there are still limitations that should be considered in 
future research: 
 
1. Much of the emissions reductions achieved in the electricity sector were driven 
by the uptake of BECCS, yet modeling of the availability of CO2 storage space 
and biomass production for these facilities lacks detail in the model used for this 
study. Both the cost of biomass fuel and CO2 storage space are assumed to be 
fixed in this model, which may not accurately reflect the dynamics at play. To 
partially offset this the amount of BECCS adopted was limited, although including 
market feedbacks in the model would help to improve realism. 
 
2. In this study, I did not attempt to model the general equilibrium, macro-economic 
dynamics of the Canadian economy. As the Canadian economy responds to 
stringent decarbonization policies, such as those in my Flex Regs and C Tax 
cases, macroeconomic shifts may occur as investment and employment flow 
from emissions-intensive sectors to those of lower intensity. The CIMS energy-
economy model used for this study is able to incorporate partial equilibrium 
dynamics but lacks the functionality to simulate full macro-economic dynamics. 
Work by the Canadian Institute for Climate Choices (2021) has incorporated 
computable general equilibrium modeling to illustrate possible technology 
pathways which could be used to achieve carbon neutrality in Canada. However, 
there is yet to be a study which assesses the policy stringencies needed to 
achieve net-zero with this type of modeling in Canada. Future researchers have 
an exciting opportunity to fill this research gap and provide insightful results that 
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Figure A1: Market share heterogeneity based on price and v parameter (Nyboer, 1997) 
 
 




Table A2: Full list of reference policies included, and techniques used to model them in CIMS 
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Region Policy Description Implementation 
        
Federal Carbon Pricing 
Backstop Fuel 
Charge 
A charge for the release of GHG 
emissions applied to fossil fuels. It 
begins at $30/tonne CO2e and rises 
to $170/tonne by 2030. 
I applied an emissions 
price in CIMS. The price 
was also adjusted for 
inflation which resulted 
in a falling price in real 
terms. I assume carbon 
pricing and cap & trade 
stringencies in all 
provinces converge to 
meet this stringency by 
2025 




A performance standard that applies 
to industrial facilities emitting more 
than 50kt CO2e per year. Emitters 
are allocated credits to covering a 
fraction of their emissions compared 
to a baseline intensity. It begins at 
$30/tonne CO2e and rises to 
$170/tonne by 2030. 
Industries in all regions 
were exposed to the full 
carbon price and had 
revenue recycled back 
into their respective 
sectors to represent the 
effect of credit allocation. 
The price was inflation 
adjusted 






This policy shuts down coal and 
natural gas electricity generation 
facilities emitting more than 420 
tonnes CO2e/GWh by 2030 
Coal and natural gas 
facilities emitting more 
than the specified 
emissions limit were shut 
down by 2030 
  Renewable 
Fuel Standard 
Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 5% renewable fuels 
and 2% for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. This was only 
applied in Quebec and 
the Atlantic Provinces 




Set a minimum emissions standard 
for freight vehicle efficiency based 
on CO2/tonne-mile 
Made standard efficiency 
heavy freight vehicles 
unavailable after 2050 




Sets a maximum for how much CO2 
can be released per km driven 
I made standard 
efficiency gasoline 
motors unavailable after 
2020 
73 
  Building codes Regulations set minimum efficiency 
standards for new buildings 
Residential: prevented 
the sale of low and 
standard efficiency AC 
units, natural gas 
furnaces and water 
heaters, oil furnaces and 
heaters, and electric 
heating based on 
regulation. Commercial: 
Applied the same method 
to low and standard 
efficiency energy devices 





Sets minimum efficiency standards 
for energy using products 
Make non-complaint 
technologies unavailable 
by 2020-2015 including; 
incandescent light bulbs, 
certain natural gas water 







Requires 93% of electricity 
generation come from renewable 
sources 
Disallowed all emitting 
sources of electricity 
generation, except some 
diesel (for northern 
communities) 
  Landfill 
Regulations 
Regulations created to better 
manage GHGs released from landfills 
Required that 50% of 
landfills in BC use 
methane reduction 
technologies 
  Renewable 
Fuel 
Regulation 
Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 5% renewable fuels 
and 2% for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. 
  Zero-Emission 
Vehicles Act 
Requires 10% of light-duty vehicle 
sales be zero emission vehicles by 
2025, 30% by 2030 and 100% by 
2040 
Set a shrinking maximum 
market share for emitting 
vehicles which them 
becoming unable by 2040 
Alberta Renewable 
Fuels Standard 
Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 5% renewable fuels 
and 2% for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. 




Requires methane emissions from oil 
and gas production be 45% lower 
than 2014 levels by 2025 
Disallowed oil and natural 
gas extraction 
technologies without leak 





Retrofit of a 115MW coal plant with 
CCS technology 
Forced 115 MW of coal to 
be converted to coal with 







Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 7.5% renewable fuels 
and 2% for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. 




Requires methane emissions from oil 
and gas production be 45% lower 
than 2014 levels by 2025 
Disallowed oil and natural 
gas extraction 
technologies without leak 





Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 10% renewable fuels 
and 5% for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. 
  Coal phase out Phased out of coal from Manitoba’s 
electricity sector by 2010 
Retires all existing coal 




Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 10% renewable fuels 
and 5% for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. 
  Coal phase out Phased out coal generation from the 
electricity sector in 2014 
Forced all existing coal 
generation to retire by 
2015 
Quebec ZEV Mandate Requires zero emission vehicles to 
capture 9.5% market share in 2020 
then 22% in 2025 and after 
I set minimum market 
shares that had to be met 
by zero emission vehicles 
  Renewable 
Natural Gas 
Mandate 
Biomethane must make up at least 
1% of methane distributed by 2020 
and 5% in 2025 
Set minimum market 
shares for biomethane in 
natural gas using sectors 
to match the regulation 
  Renewable 
Fuel 
Regulations 
Requirement for gasoline to be 
blended with 10% in 2020 (and 15% 
in 2025) renewable fuels and 2% in 
2020 (and 4% in 2025) for diesel  
Set minimum market 
shares for ethanol in 
gasoline and biodiesel in 
diesel. 
Atlantic Electricity GHG 
emission cap 
Nova Scotia’s electricity sector 
regulations which puts an emissions 
cap on the sector that falls to 2.5 Mt 
CO2 by 2050 
Retired some coal 
generation and 
disallowed new coal 





Nova Scotia requirement that 
requires 40% of electricity 
generation in the province come 
from renewable sources 
Set minimum market 




  Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard 
New Brunswick regulation that 
requires 40% of electricity sales in 
the province come from renewable 
sources by 2020 
Set minimum market 
shares for renewable 
electricity generation 
sources 
 
